It’s tempting to assume that Donald Trump is the world’s biggest foreign policy problem. But in Australia’s case, that would be as incomplete as it is dangerous. After a week of consultations with government officials, industry leaders, and regional experts in Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney, I came away with an inescapable sense that the most urgent issues are not the ones screaming across the headlines about Trump’s latest outrage. Rather, they are hard conversations the country needs to have with itself. And leaving them unsaid is no longer viable.
The first inconvenient truth Australia must confront relates to the resources that will be required to contend with China’s growing military and unyielding ambitions. Despite stark phrases in recent strategy documents about Australia’s worsening security environment, the China challenge still feels more conceptual than visceral, more intellectual than mobilising. Distance and geography are still cited as safeguards, even as China’s missiles can reach an Australian mainland that its navy recently circumnavigated. There have also been few clarion calls from leaders in Canberra about the China threat. The result is a defence budget that appears insufficient for the growing number of tasks ahead at the very moment when the security environment demands more from US allies to help keep the peace in Asia.
Meanwhile, public US pressure has made it harder for Australian defence leaders to argue internally for greater investments without being accused of carrying Washington’s water. Much of the political class in Canberra seems to believe Prime Minister Anthony Albanese got a free pass on defence spending from Trump during their long-awaited White House meeting last October. As a result, the political appetite for significant defence increases appears low. There has been no serious effort to build support among the Australian public, and little consideration of tough fiscal choices needed to make room for more than a modest rise in military budgets.
This connects directly to a second inconvenient truth about the growing presence of the American military in Australia. Those forces are there to deter conflict, but should that fail, they will be given the role of defending Australia and projecting power into contested theatres – the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, or elsewhere. In that sense, Australia would be integral to any conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific.
I understand the sensitivity here, touching directly on questions of sovereignty and security. Trump’s America only exacerbates concerns about Australia being involved in a war with China. Yet the reality is that the Australian continent is more secure – and the prospects of conflict are lower – precisely because of Australia’s potential role in supporting the US military, not despite it. Canberra will need to do more to generate public and political support for this reality. Otherwise, defence establishments will lack the mandate to adequately prepare, and the government will struggle to generate the resources required.
A third inconvenient truth is the growing necessity for Australia to move toward collective defence with other Asian powers, notably Japan. Australian officials and experts rightly perceive the United States as a necessary but insufficient ingredient for regional security. Australia’s forthcoming strategy documents will likely emphasise the importance of middle power diplomacy, and Canberra has already demonstrated willingness to advance minilateral efforts in the absence of US leadership. Nevertheless, Australia’s actual commitment to building meaningful deterrence beyond the US bilateral alliance remains an open question.
The Australia-Japan relationship will be a critical bellwether of how far intra-ally alignment can get, with both sides reporting deepening cooperation across intelligence, policy and strategy. At the same time, it is not clear whether this activity will move beyond signalling resolve, or whether support for minilateralism in Canberra will translate into actual resources. Australia and Japan will need to ensure that defence cooperation produces real combat-credible deterrence, including the political authorities and integrated command structures required to fight together if necessary. Experts and officials may wince at the term “alliance”, but genuine deterrence (not just signalling resolve) will require Australia and Japan to move toward collective defence at an accelerated pace.
None of this is to dismiss what Australia has already put in motion – AUKUS, US force posture initiatives, the deepening ties with Japan and other partners all represent serious bets on the future. But the overall gap between requirements and execution is widening.
As someone who has helped manage the US-Australia alliance, I do not raise these questions lightly. More than one Australian interlocutor has warned that America might not like the answer it gets on questions of Australia’s defence budget, the US military presence on Australian soil, and the future of its defence ties with Japan. But these conversations are more necessary than ever. The current trajectory is unlikely to meet the scale of the task, and the costs of inaction will be severe if deterrence fails. As Joe Biden often said, “No foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people.” The same will be true in Australia.
