In a landmark study of the Naxalite movement, the anthropologist Alpa Shah interrogates the motivations of the most committed adherents of Naxalism she encounters during her field research; men who, like Rao, had spent years, if not decades, waging an increasingly unwinnable war against the state.
Shah’s account makes it plain that the insurgents sorely lack a theory of victory, clear political goals that must be unambiguously achieved through strategic use of force. While criminality – in the form of extortion and protection payments – is a motivating factor for many Naxals, it too does not fully explain the story. Instead, in Shah’s telling, abstract notions of class struggle, social and economic justice, and tales of communist revolutions animate adherents, especially its upper-caste, educated leadership. They not only help the insurgents interpret the world around them and act accordingly, but also furnish a shared vocabulary. Ideology cements in-group ties amid tremendous hardship and significant personal sacrifices.
While for the rest of the world, the Indian society’s “feudal” nature would only be debated in sophomoric late-night bull sessions, for the Naxals it is an existential issue. To wit, agriculture accounts for only a little more than 18 per cent of India’s GDP, provides livelihoods for a minority (albeit a large one), and the country is urbanising rapidly. Therefore, some Naxals rightly apprehend that the entire movement, premised on an eventual large-scale rural uprising, is becoming moot, or worse, has been so for some time.
The extent to which arcane blinkers shape the Naxal worldview became clear in a secret memorandum the insurgent leadership had circulated in August last year, which identified “postmodernism” as one of the reasons behind eroding support. Meanwhile, Indian security forces eliminated some 300-odd Naxals last year alone, while the once-Naxal-hub Andhra Pradesh – Rao’s birthplace – became, by per capita income, one of the fastest growing Indian states.
But all this is not to argue that Naxals have been mostly talk and little action. They have been responsible for around 12,000 deaths (including that of more than 4000 civilians) over the past 25 years. But what is interesting is how most acts of Naxal terrorism resemble “propaganda of the deed” where the objective is “to galvanise … before offering an internally legitimate narrative”, as three experts of the phenomena noted in a 2008 RUSI report. After all, killing a significant number of security personnel in sporadic attacks – a common Naxal play – is sure to draw significant retribution, especially from a determined, numerically and materially superior adversary. Therefore, other than as spectacle for the wider world, and rousing the rank and file, they serve no meaningful political purpose.
Such is the causative power of ideological thinking.