India, explained.
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Tokyo in August (Takashi Aoyama via Anadolu/Getty Images)
Security convergence with New Delhi looks set to deepen, but nationalist priorities in Tokyo may shift the tone of economic engagement.
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Japan’s hawkish turn under Takaichi tests India’s balancing actJapan’s hawkish turn under Takaichi tests India’s balancing act
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quick to congratulate Sanae Takaichi on becoming Japan’s new leader this week, calling India–Japan ties “vital for peace, stability and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.” The statement came at a moment of transition in Tokyo. Takaichi, a conservative known for her hawkish stance on China and strict domestic policies, inherits both Shinzo Abe’s strategic legacy and Japan’s anxiety about its economic slowdown. Her arrival raises an important question for New Delhi: how will India work with a Japan that is assertive abroad but increasingly inward-looking at home?
India–Japan relations have matured into one of the most dependable pillars of Indo-Pacific cooperation. From joint naval exercises and defence technology sharing to the Quad’s coordination on regional connectivity, the partnership exhibits converging interests and mutual trust. Both nations view China’s growing maritime assertiveness as a threat to regional stability. Takaichi’s election is likely to reinforce this convergence. Her worldview, which is steeped in national pride, corresponds with India’s preference for an assertive yet rules-based Indo-Pacific order. Under her leadership, Tokyo may accelerate defence investments and intelligence coordination with New Delhi, building upon previous frameworks established under Abe and Fumio Kishida.
However, the tone and tempo may change. Takaichi is expected to frame foreign policy through a sharper domestic lens, making Japan’s security cooperation more tightly linked to its economic and industrial interests. That shift could prompt India to recalibrate how it engages Tokyo as a co-investor in regional resilience. Although the security dimension seems poised for growth, Japan’s domestic orientation under Takaichi could complicate economic cooperation. Her emphasis on revitalising domestic industries, tightening immigration, and protecting Japan’s labour market may constrain Tokyo’s outward-looking economic diplomacy.
Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (The Asahi Shimbun via Getty Images)
India has benefited immensely from Japan’s infrastructure investment, including the Mumbai–Ahmedabad high-speed rail and the Northeast connectivity projects. But these big-ticket ventures were nurtured under governments committed to international economic outreach. Takaichi’s focus on economic nationalism and fiscal prudence could limit Japan’s appetite for large-scale overseas financing. For India, this can be both a boon and a bane. The challenge lies in maintaining momentum in Japanese investments amid changing domestic priorities in Tokyo. The opportunity lies in aligning Indian initiatives with Japan’s inward focus, for example, through co-development of digital infrastructure, critical minerals, or green technology, where both countries see direct domestic payoffs.
The China factor remains the quiet driver of the India–Japan partnership. Takaichi’s hawkishness on Beijing, particularly on Taiwan and the East China Sea, will likely strengthen her commitment to deterrence and defence cooperation with partners such as India, the United States, and Australia. For New Delhi, this could strengthen Japan’s support for its own border challenges with China and for freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.
As Japan becomes more security-conscious under Takaichi, India’s emphasis on inclusive regionalism could serve as a useful complement.
However, assertiveness brings risks as well. An overtly confrontational Japanese posture could heighten regional tensions and complicate India’s balancing act, especially as New Delhi continues to maintain a working relationship with Beijing in multilateral forums such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). India will need to manage the duality that encourages Japan’s strategic assertiveness, where it enhances deterrence, but discourages moves that escalate tensions in the region.
Both countries also share an interest in keeping ASEAN at the centre of Indo-Pacific discourse. As Japan becomes more security-conscious under Takaichi, India’s emphasis on inclusive regionalism could serve as a useful complement offering balance to the alliance-heavy, containment-driven undertones of Japan’s security strategy. Despite leadership changes, the institutional architecture of India–Japan relations remains strong. The 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, the Special Strategic and Global Partnership, and the Act East Forum all provide continuity and predictability.
However, Takaichi’s challenge will be to sustain Japan’s global role without losing domestic legitimacy. Even though Takaichi’s domestic focus might temper enthusiasm for grand regional visions, multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework give New Delhi and Tokyo the means to coordinate on concrete deliverables like critical minerals, semiconductor supply chains, and digital standards that advance both nations’ interests.
Moreover, personal chemistry often shapes India–Japan diplomacy. The Abe–Modi era was defined by warmth, vision, and ideological comfort. With Takaichi, the tone is yet to be defined. Both leaders see national resurgence as central to their domestic legitimacy and foreign policy projection.
Ideological affinity alone won’t sustain the partnership. The measure of success will lie in how both leaders translate symbolism into substance, whether they can balance domestic pressures with external commitments, and ensure that nationalism does not crowd out regional cooperation. The Indo-Pacific today demands assertion against coercive powers, as well as assurance that the region’s order will remain inclusive and rules-based. Takaichi’s Japan is likely to excel in the former, while India can help restore balance through the latter. If both countries can combine Japan’s technological and financial strength with India’s demographic and geopolitical reach, they can promote a regional order that remains open, stable, and multipolar.
About the author
Sanchari Ghosh
Sanchari Ghosh is a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
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