A civil war threatens to break out in Australia’s main opposition party, the Liberals, as it searches for an identity and policy platform to be competitive in the 2028 election. But what can this tell us about the future of foreign policy on the right of Australian politics?
The Liberal Party finds itself at a historic low in parliamentary representation after May’s election. Compared to Labor’s 94 lower house seats, the Liberals now hold just 28 lower house seats, along with 15 for junior Coalition partner, The Nationals. New Opposition Leader Sussan Ley put it succinctly: “We got smashed. Totally smashed. What we as the Liberal Party presented to the Australian people was comprehensively rejected.”
Naturally, this has prompted intense political and policy introspection – but it has also already unearthed fault lines.
First there was Ley’s narrow victory over Angus Taylor in the post-election leadership spill. Then there was the short-lived split between the Liberals and the Nationals. Now, two high-profile MPs have left the opposition front bench after just four months. Jacinta Nampijinpa Price was forced out over comments about Indian migrants. Then, late last week, Andrew Hastie stood down as shadow Home Affairs minister, citing his frustration at losing responsibility for immigration policy.
All this portends another chapter in the Liberal Party’s culture wars that have been running since 2009 when Malcolm Turnbull rolled Brendan Nelson to become opposition leader. The next three years will see clashes continue between two loose groupings: moderate pragmatists versus more conservative ideologues.
One side is premised on openness and diplomacy, the other on prizing sovereignty and prioritising defence and security
Naturally, the debate over the Liberal Party’s future has been focused on internal politics and domestic issues. But ongoing uncertainty about the Coalition’s commitment to net zero carbon emissions and calls by some MPs to slash immigration hint that international issues are also critical.
Beyond this, the Liberals’ official foreign policy since the election has been largely responsive and tactical. Vocal support of Israel has continued, while criticising the government’s recognition of a Palestinian state and its record on anti-Semitism.
More broadly, Ley and shadow foreign minister Michaelia Cash have rarely ventured beyond partisan jabs at the government’s diplomacy. The prime minister’s travel to China and the United Kingdom was scrutinised. Vanuatu’s last minute withdrawal and Papua New Guinea’s delay in signing security pacts provided cheap fodder for criticism. And Albanese’s long wait to secure a meeting with Trump and the government’s inability to secure a tariff exemption for Australian exports to the United States have been recurring talking points.
While it is too much to expect a grand strategic vision so soon after an electoral drubbing, neither Ley nor Cash have begun to articulate a foreign policy for an alternative government. To provide credible accountability for the government and a genuine contest of ideas, Australians should demand a fuller foreign policy offering from the Coalition well ahead of the 2028 election.
In the meantime, however, it is worth projecting further ahead to imagine how foreign policy on the right might evolve. The Coalition is unlikely to return to government before 2031 at the earliest, meaning it is more useful to focus on the contours of ideology and political instincts rather than on current affairs.
Though the actual factional makeup of the Liberal Party is more fractured and complex, an ideological cleavage on international policy is crystallising between a centre-right wing and a reactionary conservative grouping.
Key figures in the centre-right side include Ley, Andrew Bragg, Dan Tehan, Zoe McKenzie, Tim Wilson, Dave Sharma, and Alex Hawke (at least in policy terms). On the conservative side, Hastie, Taylor, Price, James Paterson and Jonathan Duniam are emerging as the most influential voices.
These rival blocs have become defined by their opposing views on at least four issues.
First, immigration. Both Hastie and Price have seized upon the populist anti-migration wave sweeping the West, calling for significant cuts to legal migration to Australia. A mix of economic (especially the supply of affordable housing) and cultural concerns are driving this view, with Hastie claiming Australians are “starting to feel like strangers in our own home”.
By contrast, moderates and pragmatists recognise both the economic necessity of migration, as well as the electoral downsides of alienating migrants. Ley said as much in her first major speech as leader:
“Migrants and our newest citizens deserve the full protection and full opportunity of a life in Australia and the Coalition will always put in place the resources to give them that security.”
Meanwhile, stark divides over climate policy are already roiling the party. Several conservatives oppose the net zero by 2050 agenda, motivated by a mix of climate denialism and apprehension about the costs of energy transition. Centre-right MPs are more likely to see the opportunities for innovation and economic diversification in upholding both domestic and international climate targets, as well as the importance of the environment for inner city voters in formerly Liberal blue-ribbon seats. Where the Liberals, and the shadow cabinet, land on net zero in the next year will be a major test for Ley’s leadership – but even that is unlikely to settle the issue permanently. A compromise position (for instance, committing in principle to Net Zero but deferring meaningful action) may attempt to please both sides – but in reality it will placate neither.
Trade and domestic manufacturing have now also become bellwethers. Hastie recently called for a revival of Australia’s automotive industry, consistent with his penchant for economic nationalism focused on boosting industrial capacity and energy security. This is a long way from the neoliberal orthodoxy of previous Coalition governments who have championed free trade and discontinued subsidies for onshore car production. The Nationals could play a decisive role on trade policy, currently holding the portfolio. Though opening up international markets for agricultural trade has long been a priority for the rural-based party, some members including Matt Canavan have also been strong supporters of government intervention to protect and grow domestic manufacturing.
Finally, the two rival camps take different views on how Australia should position itself in relation to the United States and China.
The Liberal Party is a long way from power – but how it sees Australia’s place in the world remains important for the tenor of political debate and long-term continuity in foreign policy.
The centrists tend to be more open to pragmatic engagement with China that emphasises diplomacy and trade. “I want Australia and China to have a good relationship”, Ley told the National Press Club in June. “When it comes to our two great countries, there is much to be optimistic about.” Meanwhile, conservatives such as Hastie and Paterson (both prominent members of the “Wolverines”) favour strident criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and are wary of economic overdependence on Beijing.
While all sides of the Liberal Party are strong supporters of the US alliance and AUKUS, some conservatives have embraced Trump-like rhetoric and MAGA-style populism. While reluctant to say it out loud, moderates are more likely to have reservations about the political direction of the US under Trump. Individually, Hastie has staked out an interesting position, calling both for greater transparency in the alliance and warning against Australia being dependent on either the US or China for artificial intelligence.
Taken together, these stances portray two very different futures for the Liberal Party’s foreign policy. One is premised on openness and diplomacy; the other on prizing sovereignty and prioritising defence and security.
There are important electoral implications for whichever becomes ascendant in the party over coming years. It is difficult to see a pathway back to power for the Coalition without the Liberals recapturing the metropolitan seats in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth lost at the last two elections. Given the multicultural, relatively high-income and environmentally conscious disposition of most of these constituencies, the centre-right foreign policy offering is likely to be more appealing.
Australia’s system of compulsory and preferential voting also means that elections tend to be won in the centre. Though appeals to economic and cultural nationalism under a MAGA-lite platform might motivate conservative party members and draw first preferences from far-right parties, they are unlikely to resonate with centrist swing voters.
The Liberal Party is a long way from power – but how it sees Australia’s place in the world remains important for the tenor of political debate and long-term continuity in foreign policy.
