Taiwan, explained.
Lithuania has become a highly sophisticated manufacturer of modern laser technology, much of which is vital to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (Getty Images)
A Soviet-era research program now helps protect Taiwan's chip dominance, and with it, the silicon shield.
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Lithuania took on China – and lasered in on TaiwanLithuania took on China – and lasered in on Taiwan
In late 2021, a nondescript building on the edge of central Vilnius created a geopolitical storm. When Taiwan sought to open a diplomatic office in Lithuania, the Lithuanian government decided to dispense with the naming conventions for Taiwan’s overseas missions – which is usually the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office – and allowed the office to be called the Taiwan Representative Office (Opens in new window). Still not an embassy, but enough of a linguistic shift to infuriate China.
In response, Beijing demanded Vilnius withdraw its ambassador (Opens in new window) and downgraded diplomatic relations, and it blocked or delayed Lithuanian exports into China, alongside pressuring European companies not to use Lithuanian components in their products. The measures were intended to force (Opens in new window) Lithuania to reverse its decision, and deter other countries from following Lithuania’s lead.
But lost amid the drama was why Taiwan would use its limited diplomatic resources to set up shop in Lithuania in the first place. The Baltic country is far from Taipei’s direct security concerns across the Taiwan Strait, and on the surface lacks the global influence to be a powerful champion of Taiwan’s cause.
A diplomatic departure that defied a pressure campaign by Beijing (Petras Malukas/AFP via Getty Image)
However, Taiwan had recognised that Lithuania had developed a sophisticated niche that was critical to its economic interests and wider global strategy. Lithuania had become a highly sophisticated manufacturer of modern laser technology, much of which is vital to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.
In the 1960s, Lithuanian physicists were invited (Opens in new window) to Moscow to participate in the Soviet Union’s burgeoning laser research. These physicists were able to transplant much of this research back to Vilnius and begin constructing laboratories and specialisations. Ultrashort pulses became one of these specialisations.
The collapse of the Soviet Union also brought a collapse in research funding, so Lithuanian scientists responded by commercialising the expertise they had developed, building companies around specialised laser technologies rather than competing on scale, prioritising the more technically demanding areas in the field.
This piqued the interest of the Taiwanese.
Ultrashort pulses are central (Opens in new window) to semiconductor manufacturing because they allow extremely precise processing of materials at microscopic scales without generating the heat that can damage surrounding structures. As semiconductor components become smaller and more complex, the type of laser precision that Lithuanian companies specialise in is becoming increasingly valuable, particularly for stacking multiple semiconductors to increase computing capability.
It is this expertise that gives other countries a material stake in defending the status quo of Taiwan's de facto independence.
This complementary expertise (Opens in new window) has bound Taiwan and Lithuania to each other’s future. Alongside importing Lithuanian laser technology, in 2023 Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute and the Lithuanian Laser Association established (Opens in new window) the Ultrafast Laser Technology Research and Innovation Centre (ULTRI) to enhance their collaboration in the field. In early September, Taiwan and Lithuania signed a new memorandum of understanding (Opens in new window) to expand the work of ULTRI with a new injection of funding and with the explicit focus on semiconductor applications for laser research.
This collaboration is far greater than simple economic exchange. Taiwan sees semiconductors as being (Opens in new window) to the 21st century what petroleum was to the 20th. They underpin virtually every facet of the modern global economy, from smartphones and cars to AI data centres and weapons systems, making their supply chains a matter of both economic competitiveness and national security.
It is this perspective on the essential nature of semiconductors that drives Taiwan’s “silicon shield (Opens in new window)” – the idea that Taiwan’s dominance in advanced chip manufacturing, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), can deter any attempt by China to annex it by threatening catastrophic technological and global supply chain disruption if war broke out. It is this expertise that gives other countries a material stake in defending the status quo of Taiwan’s de facto independence.
This shield, however, is only as strong as its market dominance. Should other countries be able to out-compete Taiwan’s expertise in the field, then greater vulnerability (Opens in new window) to Chinese aggression starts to emerge. This necessitates the Taiwanese being hyper-aware of the advances in complementary technology like lasers and building durable partnerships to be able to incorporate these technologies into their semiconductor industry.
In Lithuania, Taiwan has not only found a strong technological partner, but a sympathetic ally. Lithuania’s own recent history as a small nation subjugated by a neighbouring great power gives it an empathy (Opens in new window) for Taiwan’s situation. With Russia’s current belligerent war on Lithuania’s doorstep, Vilnius has an acute understanding of what is at stake for Taiwan.
Lithuania has also positioned itself as a nation seeking to shape the geopolitical environment through moral courage and diplomatic energy. Vilnius often strides out in front (Opens in new window) of the larger European powers in its advocacy for Ukraine and then uses this diplomatic entrepreneurship to challenge European states to follow. The dispute over the Taiwan Representative Office was a further expression of this instinct – demonstrating Vilnius's unwillingness to submit itself to China’s legal fiction concerning Taiwan.
Trade between Lithuania and China has largely recovered (Opens in new window), and the Taiwan Representative Office has retained its name. However, the more consequential story has developed within Lithuania’s laboratories. Economic statecraft and technological interdependence are becoming as important to security as troops and treaties, and it may be Lithuania’s ultrashort pulse lasers that become one of the central tools of peace in the Indo-Pacific.
About the author
Grant Wyeth
Grant Wyeth is a columnist for The Diplomat and is the editor at Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy and Defence Dialogue (AP4D).
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