Africa, explained.

A general view of the entrance to the Kamoa Copper S.A. underground mine in Kolwezi, iDemocratic Republic of the Congo

Africa holds a major share of the world’s mineral reserves and will be central to the batteries, grids, electric vehicles and renewable infrastructure that decarbonisation requires (Glody Murhabazi/AFP via Getty Images)

Minerals diplomacy is Australia’s opening in Africa

Mining expertise is a chance for Australia to capitalise on Africa’s desire for fairer mineral deals.

Christopher Burke

9 September 20264 min read

Canberra’s campaign for a 2029–30 (Opens in new window)non-permanent (Opens in new window)seat (Opens in new window) on the United Nations Security Council cannot be won in New York alone. Even in an uncontested race, Africa’s diplomatic weight is clear, with dozens of votes in the General Assembly. The harder question is what sustained Australian engagement can offer beyond campaign visits and requests for support.

Australia’s approach to Africa policy is that of an episodic partner, visible when votes are needed, but less present as African priorities are being shaped. Canberra has deep experience in mining, (Opens in new window)governance (Opens in new window), education (Opens in new window), agriculture, peacekeeping (Opens in new window) and development (Opens in new window), but its diplomatic machinery leans heavily toward the Asia-Pacific.

Mineral diplomacy offers a practical route to deeper, long-term relations with Africa.

The Africa (Opens in new window)Down (Opens in new window)Under (Opens in new window)2026 (Opens in new window) conference in Perth last week brought together African ministers, business delegations, investors and mining leaders for three days of presentations, meetings and networking. The Ugandan (Opens in new window)delegation (Opens in new window) framed the event as a platform for responsible investment, technology transfer, skills development and mineral value addition – evidence that mineral diplomacy belongs near the centre of Australia’s African engagement.

More than 170 (Opens in new window)Australian (Opens in new window)companies (Opens in new window)operate (Opens in new window)in (Opens in new window)Africa (Opens in new window)’s mining and resources sector, with current and potential investment worth over $40 billion. This is a robust commercial footprint. This commercial presence has yet to be converted into a coherent diplomatic strategy. The post-2030 (Opens in new window)development (Opens in new window)agenda (Opens in new window) offers an opening to develop a proposition centred on responsible supply chains, local value addition and African participation in setting global rules.

Australia is well placed to support this shift and should avoid appearing as another external rule-maker.

The timing is right. The energy (Opens in new window)transition (Opens in new window)has (Opens in new window)intensified (Opens in new window)demand (Opens in new window) for lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel, graphite, manganese and rare earths. Africa holds a major share of the world’s (Opens in new window)mineral (Opens in new window)reserves (Opens in new window) and will be central to the batteries, grids, electric vehicles and renewable infrastructure that decarbonisation requires. African governments know this. They are also aware a green transition built on raw mineral exports, weak processing capacity and external control of technology could reproduce the same structural inequalities that shaped earlier commodity cycles.

Resource equity could become the core of Australia’s pitch. African states are demanding more than investment: beneficiation, refining, skills transfer, infrastructure, local procurement, transparent contracts, environmental protection and a fairer share of the value created from their own resources. The African (Opens in new window)Union’s (Opens in new window)focus (Opens in new window)on (Opens in new window)industrialisation (Opens in new window)and (Opens in new window)value (Opens in new window)addition (Opens in new window) reflects a broader political shift. Resource-rich states want to move from being suppliers of inputs to owners of strategic supply chains.

Australia is well placed to support this shift and should avoid appearing as another external rule-maker. China brings capital, infrastructure, market access and scale. Gulf investors bring liquidity and speed. Western partners bring finance and standards. Australia’s distinctive offer is different. It combines mining (Opens in new window)expertise (Opens in new window), listed-company discipline, environmental (Opens in new window)regulation (Opens in new window), mine safety practice, geological (Opens in new window)knowledge (Opens in new window), experience in infrastructure and transport (Opens in new window), mining technology and experience with land rights and community consent. These are practical tools African governments can use to negotiate better projects and retain more value.

The diplomatic proposition should be concrete. Australia could work with African partners to champion a post-2030 (Opens in new window)resource (Opens in new window)equity (Opens in new window)compact (Opens in new window)within (Opens in new window)the (Opens in new window)UN (Opens in new window)system (Opens in new window). Such a compact would not tell African states how to manage their minerals, but affirm that clean-energy supply chains support domestic (Opens in new window)processing (Opens in new window), local employment, transparent revenue management, community rights and environmental safeguards. It should recognise that climate ambition cannot be separated from economic sovereignty in producer countries.

This would give Australian diplomats stronger language than generic partnership references. A practical package could include co-sponsored UN initiatives, regulator exchanges, mining-governance scholarships, geological survey support (Opens in new window), cooperation on local content, traceability and rehabilitation, and dialogue with the African Union and African Development Bank. African governments could be engaged not as recipients of Australian expertise, but as co-authors of the rules shaping the global mineral economy.

A small Australia-Africa mineral diplomacy platform could give this agenda institutional form. It could bring together government, industry, universities, regulators and African partners to identify pilots, share technical knowledge and align engagement with African development priorities.

Mineral diplomacy does not provide Australia with a shortcut to African votes. It could give substance to the sustained (Opens in new window)relationships (Opens in new window) a credible Security Council campaign requires and give Canberra a reason to engage the individuals and institutions Australian mining equipment, technology and services (METS) providers need to identify across the continent. Cooperation must stand on its own value to African partners rather than appear as assistance attached to an electoral request.

Australia need not overstate its influence in Africa. Canberra should be precise. Its advantage lies in linking mining expertise to Africa’s demand for value addition, standards-setting and fairer resource governance. Helping African partners secure a stronger place in the critical-minerals order (Opens in new window) could make mineral diplomacy more than a campaign theme. It could contribute to the post-2030 settlement, deepen African relationships and strengthen the credibility of its Security Council bid.

About the author

Christopher Burke

Christopher Burke is a senior advisor at WMC Africa, a communications and advisory agency located in Kampala, Uganda.

Topics

Africa Australia Energy & resources United Nations