Myanmar earthquake: Why the junta has turned away aid

As monsoon rains loom, the Myanmar junta’s selective acceptance of international aid following a devastating earthquake in March – welcoming assistance from allies such as China, India and Russia, while rejecting Taiwan’s 126-member rescue team – has deepened the humanitarian crisis. The aftermath has again exposed the regime’s prioritisation of political control over citizen lives. It leaves urgent questions about equitable aid distribution in a nation fractured by civil war – a pattern that echoes the junta’s response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 when it initially rejected UN aid.

The 7.7 magnitude earthquake on 28 March this year claimed at least 3,600 lives, with estimates suggesting the toll could potentially stand at up to 10,000. Severe damage from the epicentre near Myanmar’s second-largest city Mandalay left roads and buildings in dangerous condition, and left millions in need of food, water, shelter and medication.

The junta’s rejection of Taiwan’s rescue team, which waited 48 hours before being denied entry, underscores a troubling gatekeeping strategy.

The junta’s rapid appeal for international assistance post-earthquake was a rare departure from its insular stance since the 2021 coup. China dispatched US$13.9 million in emergency aid, India sent naval ships and an 80-member disaster response team, and Russia, Thailand, Vietnam and the UAE deployed rescue teams. The United States pledged US$9 million, the European Commission allocated €13 million and the UN released US$5 million from its emergency fund. Japan, as a consistent donor, provided emergency supplies through its International Cooperation Agency. International NGOs such as the World Food Program and UNICEF mobilised, distributing food and shelter in Mandalay and Naypyitaw, though local NGOs reported bureaucratic delays.

However, the junta’s rejection of Taiwan’s rescue team, which waited 48 hours before being denied entry, underscores a troubling gatekeeping strategy. Taiwan, despite offering US$50,000 through its Red Cross, was sidelined – likely due to the junta’s alignment with China, which views Taiwan as a diplomatic rival. Similarly, the junta restricted foreign media and imposed curfews, hindering rescue efforts. Reports indicate military checkpoints blocked aid to resistance-controlled areas such as Sagaing – where local groups must either register with the military regime or risk having their assets confiscated.

Politically, the junta’s selective aid acceptance serves multiple ends. By embracing aid from allies such as China, India and Russia, the regime bolsters its international legitimacy, strained since the coup. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s meetings with Indian and Thai leaders at the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok in April leveraged the disaster to rekindle diplomacy. This mirrors the junta’s post-Nargis playbook, where it eventually accepted ASEAN and UN aid to deflect criticism but held a constitutional referendum amid the crisis, prioritising power over relief. Today, with a planned December 2025 election looming, the junta may be using aid to shore up support in urban centres such as Mandalay to weaken opponents.

The junta’s actions also reflect a broader strategy of control in Myanmar’s civil war, which has displaced more than three million people. Airstrikes in Sagaing post-earthquake and restrictions on internet access have complicated relief efforts, drawing condemnation from UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, who called the military’s actions “nothing short of incredible”. By controlling aid flows, the junta not only limits support to resistance groups but also reinforces its narrative of sovereignty – a tactic seen in 2008 when it feared foreign intervention.