Myanmar, explained.

A woman shows her inked finger after casting her vote at a polling station during the second phase of Myanmar's general election at Kawhmu township in Yangon, 11 January 2026 (Sai Aung Main/AFP via Getty Images)

Myanmar's election is a test ASEAN cannot afford to fail

Myanmar's military seeks legitimacy through managed elections. The Philippines must decide how ASEAN will respond.

Yuyun Wahyuningrum

13 January 20264 min read

On 28 December 2025, Myanmar’s military junta began what it calls a “phased election”. The process, which will continue until 25 January, is being presented by the generals as a roadmap back to stability and constitutional government. In reality, it is neither nationwide, fair, free nor competitive, and it takes place amid an ongoing civil war.

What remains uncertain — and far more consequential than the election itself — is how Southeast Asia, and ASEAN in particular, will respond. It is a test of whether electoral rituals can be used to rehabilitate authoritarian rule and, in so doing, reshape the region’s political order.

The first phase of voting was held in around one-third of Myanmar’s townships, excluding large areas affected by conflict or controlled by resistance forces. Major opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy, were dissolved before the election, while key political leaders remain imprisoned. Independent observers were absent, media freedoms were tightly restricted, and campaigning was conducted under military surveillance.

Despite these conditions, the junta claims a turnout of around 50–52%, a figure widely reported but impossible to independently verify. State-aligned parties have already declared sweeping victories, with the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), claiming an implausible 80% “landslide” in contested seats.

These claims underscore the purpose of the exercise. This is not an election designed to translate popular will into political authority. It is an attempt to manufacture procedural legitimacy without altering the underlying structure of military dominance.

Myanmar’s election is not a step toward peace or democratic recovery. It is an attempt to stabilise authoritarian rule through electoral form.

For ASEAN, the danger lies not in formally endorsing the vote but in allowing it to quietly reset regional engagement. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, speaking as ASEAN chair, has said the bloc will review post-election developments while avoiding premature legitimisation. This careful language reflects ASEAN’s longstanding preference for consensus and non-interference. Yet in Myanmar’s case, caution risks sliding into acquiescence.

Treating the election as a potential step forward risks hollowing out ASEAN’s own framework. The Five-Point Consensus did not envisage elections held under emergency rule, amid mass displacement, and in the absence of political pluralism. To accept the junta’s electoral timeline as progress is to allow compliance to be redefined by the violator.

This has implications far beyond Myanmar. ASEAN has long justified its legitimacy in terms of stability rather than shared democratic values. But Myanmar’s instability has not been produced by external pressure; it has been generated by the state itself. If a military regime can overthrow an elected government, imprison its opponents, prosecute a nationwide war, and then regain regional standing through managed elections, the precedent will resonate across Southeast Asia.

This matters for regional order. The signal would be unmistakable: sovereignty and electoral form outweigh democratic substance.

Some argue that even deeply flawed elections can open space for gradual reform or that ASEAN has no alternative but cautious engagement. Such arguments may apply in semi-authoritarian contexts where opposition participation is constrained but real. Myanmar is not such a case. Political competition has been eliminated, dissent criminalised, and law weaponised to exclude rivals. There is no reformist pathway embedded in this process — only regime consolidation.

ASEAN’s limited leverage derives precisely from its collective stance since 2021. Diluting that stance now would weaken, not strengthen, the bloc’s authority. A credible approach requires clarity on three points.

First, ASEAN should state unambiguously that elections conducted without inclusivity, security, and political freedom cannot confer legitimacy. Ambiguity will be read by the junta as acceptance and by Myanmar’s opposition as abandonment.

Second, humanitarian engagement must be decoupled from political validation. Aid is urgently needed, but it should not be framed as cooperation with a “post-election” government. Cross-border and non-state delivery mechanisms should be expanded where possible, rather than reinforcing junta-controlled channels.

Third, ASEAN must widen its diplomatic lens. Myanmar’s future will not be decided solely in Naypyidaw. Ethnic armed organisations, civil society networks, and the National Unity Government — however contested — are central political actors. Excluding them entrenches the illusion that order can be restored from above.

This brings the focus to ASEAN’s chair for 2026. The Philippines has historically positioned itself as a regional advocate for democratic norms and constitutionalism. The question is whether Manila will treat Myanmar’s election as a closed chapter or as an unresolved challenge requiring sustained regional leadership.

Myanmar’s election is not a step toward peace or democratic recovery. It is an attempt to stabilise authoritarian rule through electoral form. Whether that attempt succeeds depends less on turnout figures than on whether ASEAN — under Philippines leadership — is prepared to defend the distinction between elections and legitimacy.

About the author

Yuyun Wahyuningrum

Yuyun Wahyuningrum is Senior Fellow for Atrocity Prevention and Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland.

Topics

Myanmar ASEAN