Myanmar, explained.

Myanmar's junta chief Min Aung Hlaing (R) attends a ceremony to mark the 10th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Naypyidaw on 15 October 2025 (AFP via Getty)

The myth of “soft-liners” in Myanmar's military governments

Like any large organisation, Myanmar's military contains conflicting views. But the generals share a number of core beliefs.

Andrew Selth

3 November 20254 min read

In the lead-up to the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia last week, there were calls for ASEAN to pay greater attention to Myanmar’s long-running polycrisis. Implicit in these calls was the notion that, somewhere in Myanmar’s military leadership, there is a moderate faction with which the international community can profitably deal. This belief is sadly mistaken.

The generals have always shared a number of core beliefs, notably the need for the Tatmadaw to retain effective control over national affairs.

Ever since the collapse of General Ne Win’s socialist regime in 1988, there have been references in the news media and academic literature to moderate factions within Myanmar's armed forces (or Tatmadaw). It has been claimed that these so-called “soft-liners” could, given the opportunity, oust or at least exercise a moderating influence over the “hardliners” who have dominated successive military governments.

Following the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988, for example, these hopes were encouraged by the relaxation of restrictions on speech and association, and the introduction of economic reforms. This was despite the regime’s refusal to acknowledge the outcome of the 1990 elections, which resulted in a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy.

Also, under the SLORC and its 1997 replacement, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the chief of the country’s most powerful intelligence organisation, General Khin Nyunt, was frequently characterised by foreign commentators as a relative moderate. This was mainly because he seemed prepared to acknowledge Myanmar’s many problems and to tolerate greater contact between Myanmar and the outside world.

The “disciplined democracy” inaugurated in 2011 encouraged hopes that moderate elements in the Tatmadaw would introduce a range of reforms, and for a period this seemed to be the case. The new parliament was described by one expert as being “precariously balanced between soft-liners and hardliners”, held in check by paramount military leader Senior General Than Shwe.

Following the 2021 coup, a few pundits looked for moderates in the Tatmadaw who might lead the security forces back to their barracks. They asked: “are ‘soft-liners’ the key to ending the crisis?”. No evidence was provided, however, that such a faction existed or, if so, would ever be in a position to make a real difference.

The Tatmadaw’s internal dynamics have always been opaque, but over the years there have been occasional signs that the military hierarchy encompassed a wide range of views. Not all senior officers were opposed to political and economic reform, and from time to time individuals said things, both privately and in public, that suggested they would welcome greater popular participation in government.

Also, up to 2021 at least, the Tatmadaw’s high command was prepared to contemplate a gradual loosening of its grip on the country, and the greater exercise of freedoms by both the government and civilian population. After all, it was the SPDC that introduced the new constitution in 2008 permitting Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularly elected administration to share government with the armed forces between 2016 and 2020.

The “disciplined democracy” inaugurated in 2011 encouraged hopes that moderate elements in the Tatmadaw would introduce a range of reforms, and for a period this seemed to be the case.

All that said, the distinction between so-called soft-liners and hardliners in the armed forces should not be overstated. As Morten Pedersen has written, “The actual distribution of views is complex and not internally consistent across different issues”.

More to the point, while the generals have argued among themselves from time to time, there have been no serious disagreements on fundamental policy issues like the need for the Tatmadaw to play a key national role, or to act as guarantor of the country’s unity, stability and sovereignty, as perceived by the armed forces leadership. Indeed, these three “national causes” have recently been reconfirmed by the junta.

In that respect at least, Myanmar’s military leadership has always been made up of hardliners.

Bear in mind that General Khin Nyunt, who was held up by many observers as the one general who could “save” Myanmar, was for more than 20 years the ruthless head of a vast intelligence apparatus that brutally repressed the country’s population.

Also, while the introduction of a “disciplined democracy” in 2011, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s election in 2015, have been held up as victories for soft-liners, it needs to be remembered that these developments took place because they were in the interests of the Tatmadaw. The generals felt sufficiently in control of Myanmar to permit them to occur, as they were seen to offer certain benefits to the country and armed forces.

The Tatmadaw has never been a homogenous mass, as sometimes depicted by journalists and activists, nor has the military leadership agreed on all counts. Like any large organisation, there have been different views on a host of subjects. However, the generals have always shared a number of core beliefs, notably the need for the Tatmadaw to retain effective control over national affairs.

Also, those officers currently serving under coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing hold their positions largely because of their unquestioned loyalty and acceptance of his hardline stance.

With that in mind, calls by foreign governments, international organisations and others for dialogue, compromise and power sharing in Myanmar must be considered wishful thinking.

About the author

Andrew Selth

Dr Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, at Griffith University, Brisbane, and author of numerous books, monographs and articles on Myanmar.

Topics

Myanmar