It is important to remember the historically cyclical nature of the relationship between India and Bangladesh (Getty Images)

Navigating new realities in India–Bangladesh ties

Quiet rather than “megaphone” diplomacy will help Delhi and Dhaka forge a mutually beneficial relationship.

Rushali Saha

4 March 20255 min read

India–Bangladesh ties, once hailed as a “model for bilateral relations for the entire region”, have declined rapidly since former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation in August last year, following violent student-led protests. During Hasina’s tenure, Delhi enjoyed a cosy relationship with Dhaka marked by numerous high-level visits, agreements spanning from river water sharing to space, and new connectivity and energy initiatives. However, Hasina’s ouster exposed the inherent structural risks stemming from Delhi’s excessive reliance on aligned political entities.

Since the swearing in of Muhammad Yunus, who is leading the current interim government, outreach attempts by Delhi have yielded few results. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri paid a one-day visit to Dhaka in December where both sides held “frank, candid, and constructive talks” and agreed to enhance “consultations and cooperation” to address mutual concerns. Despite Misri raising the issue of attacks on minorities, particularly Hindus, urging Bangladesh to take action, such assaults have continued unabated. From late November until late January, 76 attacks against Hindus were reported in Bangladesh.

Despite India distancing itself from Hasina’s repeated remarks targeting Yunus and members of the interim government, the perceived inaction from Delhi remains an irritant.

Meanwhile, Delhi’s lack of response to Bangladesh’s request to extradite Hasina has irked Dhaka, which has threatened to seek international intervention if necessary. Despite India distancing itself from Hasina’s repeated remarks targeting Yunus and members of the interim government, the perceived inaction from Delhi remains an irritant.

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met his Bangladeshi counterpart Md. Touhid Hossain on the sidelines of the Indian Ocean Conference in Oman in February. According to a statement by Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka sought Delhi’s consideration to hold the next South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Standing Committee meeting – last held in 2016 – in Bangladesh. Not only did the Ministry of External Affairs dismiss this request, but made a veiled attack on Pakistan by commenting “everyone in South Asia is aware of which country and what activities are responsible for stymieing SAARC”. The MEA also conveyed to Dhaka “it should not normalise terrorism” – possibly alluding to the growing rapprochement between Pakistan and Bangladesh fuelling Delhi’s fears that Dhaka may cede ground to Pakistan-based militant groups to operate from its soil.

Differences also came to the fore during the recent Director General level India–Bangladesh border talks held in Delhi where Dhaka dismissed Delhi’s concerns about attacks on minorities as “exaggerated”. Meanwhile, the recent flare-up in tensions due to disparities in border fencing along the international border, was not addressed.

Recent remarks by Jaishankar at a public event asking Bangladesh to “make up their minds” on the kind of future relationship Dhaka wants with Delhi were met with a harsh response from Hossain. He blamed Delhi for providing “hospitality” to Hasina, allowing her to make “statements” that were “damaging to the relationship” and “fuelling tensions” domestically. Such an uncharacteristic war of words indicates that bilateral relations have truly plummeted to new lows.

However, not all hope is lost. It is important to remember the historically cyclical nature of this relationship – which has soared when the Awami League has been in power, while declining under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Although Dhaka is slated to hold elections in late 2025 or early 2026, it is promising to see Delhi already reaching out to BNP leaders. The Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh met Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, general secretary of the BNP in Dhaka, in September last year, marking the beginning of official-level Indian contact with the BNP leadership. Some reports suggest that BNP members have travelled to Delhi to hold meetings, but at informal levels.

A return to status quo in Delhi–Dhaka ties is unlikely, and arguably unviable given the changed external and internal realities.

Another positive sign is a possible meeting between Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the 6th BIMSTEC summit in Thailand. BIMSTEC came up during both Misri and Jaishankar’s meetings, indicating its viability as a forum to enhance consultations and cooperation. It would also be an ideal platform for India to offer economic assistance to help revive Bangladesh’s economy and discuss mutual regional security concerns. Irrespective of the outcome, the optics of an in-person meeting will give a sense of assurance and optimism that relations are (at least) on the path to normalcy.

A return to status quo in Delhi–Dhaka ties is unlikely, and arguably unviable given the changed external and internal realities. For Delhi, the current crisis is a stark reminder that it must invest more time and energy in perception management and address, rather than stem, “anti-India” sentiment, especially in its neighbourhood. It also reinforces the need for Delhi to engage with actors across the political spectrum, and refrain from becoming entangled in domestic partisan politics.

Dhaka needs to realise that the historic trend of portraying India in a manner that suits their political interests, may produce short-term electoral benefits, but is ultimately unviable. Bangladesh should also be more accommodative of India’s security concerns and its pursuit of a stable neighbourhood, while engaging in mutually beneficial relationships.

As it stands, Delhi is taking a “wait and watch” approach to political developments in Dhaka. However, given the growing questions over Awami League’s participation in an uncertain future election and the increasing power and influence of the “interim” government, Delhi should put in more effort to make the relationship with Bangladesh work, before it is too late. Quiet, rather than “megaphone” diplomacy – an approach that has proven useful in dealing with Myanmar – will help Delhi navigate the new realities in ties with neighbouring Dhaka.

About the author

Rushali Saha

Rushali Saha serves as the Asia Desk Team Lead at Horizon Intelligence, a Belgium-based threat intelligence firm, and is an independent researcher specialising in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

Topics

Bangladesh India