Quad, explained.
Even a non-binding arrangement rests on certain expectations of consistency and restraint (Kiyoshi Ota via Getty Images)
The grouping thrives where cooperation is easy – but the real test comes when challenges turn hard.
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The Quad’s coherence problemThe Quad’s coherence problem
The Quad was built on a tacit understanding that its members – Australia, Japan, India, and the United States – did not have to agree on everything to work together where they could. That flexibility made it workable in the first place. But it also rested on an implicit expectation that even when they acted on their own, it would not undercut the broader rules-based order they each claim to support. That expectation looks less certain – and must in turn question the efficacy of the Quad.
The war in Ukraine, following Russia’s invasion, and the continuing crisis in West Asia following the US and Israeli strikes on Iran have shown how quickly priorities diverge when conflicts intensify. In such times, countries do not consistently act through groupings but instead fall back on national positions. The Quad has been no different.
India’s uneasy fit within the Quad became apparent when New Delhi chose not to condemn Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, notwithstanding its objection to the use of nuclear weapons. The other members explicitly opposed Russia, the US position becoming more complicated with the return of Donald Trump to the White House.
If the Quad cannot translate its shared concerns into collective responses when the international system is under visible strain, then its role will remain bounded.
Similarly, in the West Asian crisis, India has maintained a cautious distance, calling for dialogue but avoiding alignment with either party. The Iran conflict differs from the experience with Ukraine because Japan and Australia have taken less strident positions and are reluctant to become deeply involved.
Although the Quad was never designed to coordinate responses to distant wars, it cannot turn its back on them, as maintaining a stable order is central to its stated purpose. The ongoing crisis is unfolding across maritime and energy corridors linked to the Indo-Pacific. The Quad, by its own definition, has a stake in the stability of this wider region. Yet there has been no indication that the grouping has come together, even at the level of consultation, to address the implications of the conflict.
The China factor might be the glue that connects the members but different economic and geopolitical priorities act as the dissolvent. Not long ago, trade frictions between the United States and India showed how easily differences surface even within a cooperative framework. The Delhi-Washington disputes surfaced more than once, making the tension all the more difficult to resolve. Beyond that, times when the United States appears to act unilaterally in ways that contribute to instability complicate the internal balance of the grouping.
None of this is to suggest that the Quad should behave like a formal alliance or produce uniform responses to every crisis. Its flexibility is part of its design. But even a non-binding arrangement rests on certain expectations of consistency and restraint. When those expectations begin to weaken, there is a chance of the erosion of the very conditions that allow such a framework to function.
If the Quad cannot translate its shared concerns into collective responses when the international system is under visible strain, then its role will remain bounded. It will continue to operate most effectively in domains where cooperation is politically easy, while stepping back from arenas that demand riskier commitment. It is no surprise that the most visible progress for the Quad lies in domains such as vaccines, critical technologies, humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness. These are real areas of value and should not be dismissed. But they are also areas where cooperation is manageable. The real constraint is when challenges become hard.
The Quad can continue offering reassurance to smaller states that coordination among major Indo-Pacific actors remains possible. But the strength of this reassurance depends on a degree of predictability in how its members deal with one another. For a loose grouping like the Quad, which operates as much on trust as on shared interests, sustained unpredictability might prove to be its undoing.
About the author
Sanchari Ghosh
Sanchari Ghosh is a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
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