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Nuclear, explained.
Open arms: Donald Trump greets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman at the White House in 2025 (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)
By easing safeguards for Saudi Arabia, Washington undercuts its own case for stricter rules on Iran.
The US just lowered its own nuclear barThe US just lowered its own nuclear bar
About the author
John Carlson
John Carlson AM is a former Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (1989-2010) and currently Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and Senior Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network.
The US–Saudi Arabia nuclear cooperation agreement has not yet been made public, but from what is known so far (Opens in new window) there are serious grounds for concern. This deal compromises both the non-proliferation standards that up to now have been applied by the United States, and the contemporary standard for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applied under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The US established the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation agreements with its 2009 agreement (Opens in new window) with the United Arab Emirates. This provides that the UAE will not have uranium enrichment facilities within its territory and will accept IAEA safeguards including the Additional Protocol.
In contrast to the UAE agreement, the US–Saudi agreement does not exclude enrichment. It provides for the two parties to undertake a two-year study into the commercial viability of enrichment in Saudi Arabia. If the conclusion is positive, a joint US–Saudi enrichment program is envisaged. This would be operated by the US on a “black box” basis, without direct access to sensitive technology by the Saudis (though it is inevitable they would acquire some know-how). If the conclusion is negative, it is understood Saudi Arabia would be free to pursue enrichment independently or with other partners after 10 years.
Saudi Arabia refuses to accept the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (Opens in new window) (AP). The AP was developed as part of strengthening safeguards following discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program in the 1990s. The AP increases the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including through wider access to information and locations.
It is disturbing that the US is willing to compromise on safeguards standards.
Australia was the first country to conclude an AP (Opens in new window), in 1997. Today the AP represents the NPT safeguards standard, having been accepted by 85% of non-nuclear-weapon states with nuclear facilities. Along with Saudi Arabia, the AP holdouts include Iran, Egypt and Syria. Iran had applied the AP “provisionally”, but stopped after President Donald Trump renounced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018.
The US–Saudi agreement does not require the AP. Instead, there is a parallel bilateral safeguards agreement, not yet public, which provides (Opens in new window) for “IAEA involvement” in “additional safeguards and verification measures (for) the most proliferation sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation”. Without seeing the details it is hard to reach a judgement, but rejection of the AP raises alarm bells. A demand for weaker country-wide safeguards suggests an intention to keep nuclear options open.
Historically the United States has taken a strong position against the spread of nuclear weapons. Washington had a key role in the conclusion of the NPT and development of the IAEA safeguards system. The United States should be making every effort to universalise the AP, especially in regions of tension and high proliferation risk. It is disturbing that the US is willing to compromise on safeguards standards.
Air Force One at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 2025 (Molly Riley/Official White House Photo)
The concessions given to Saudi Arabia create a double standard, undermining the case for Iran to accept more rigorous verification. This also undermines the US “gold standard” – including under the UAE agreement itself. This provides that if the US gives more favourable terms to another Middle East country the UAE is entitled to seek equal treatment.
The current US–Iran war – and other wars in the Middle East and Ukraine – demonstrate that complex political issues cannot be resolved by force. They require diplomacy and political agreement. Where nuclear programs are involved, robust controls over technology and effective verification will be essential to any political solution. The Iran nuclear issue cannot be resolved in isolation but must be part of a regional approach. What happens in Saudi Arabia will be decisive for any lasting solution. Supporters of the non-proliferation regime – and friends and allies of the United States – should ask that with no Additional Protocol there is no enrichment program.
