The battlefields of Ukraine have seen the return of large-scale, high tempo operations. This has been accompanied by higher casualties, higher use of munitions, and greater destruction of military equipment and civil infrastructure than at any time since the Second World War.
Ukrainian industry representatives spend time at the front to collect insights direct from soldiers.
The war has had a profound impact on how both sides learn and adapt their warfighting concepts, how they train and organise forces, and how they mobilise national resources. Learning and adaptation started slowly but has gained pace, with many peacetime military organisations and government officials finding it difficult to grasp, let alone replicate.
This accelerating learning and adaptation cycle may be the most transformative development to emerge from the war. While individual technologies such as drones are changing the character of warfare, the implications of new and proliferating ways of learning and adapting have global application.
There are several notable developments in Ukrainian adaptation in the past year. Tech companies and military frontline units can now communicate directly with each other to speed up the implementation of lessons into new generations of equipment and munitions. The counter-drone battle is accelerating with the development of Ukraine’s “Drone Wall”, which incorporates sophisticated new drone interceptors that are cheaper to produce than the Russian drones they destroy. We have also seen the deployment of next-generation drone warfare, featuring drones carrying other drones.
Russian military capacity to learn and adapt has improved significantly during the war. It has “learned to learn” and has sped up its adaptation cycle across many aspects of military affairs. The Russians are close observers of Ukrainian operations, and they quickly copy Ukrainian methods that they believe work. Recent Russian adaptations include improvements to their drone attack tactics and technology, and improved infiltration tactics on the ground. First-Person View drones and next-generation drone jammers are now in widespread use in the Russian army, and it has also adapted its strategic force generation and personnel recruitment processes.
The learning and adaptation cycle now extends globally, with a tighter interactivity between learning at the battlefield, national and international levels. This now includes collaboration and sharing of ideas and technologies among authoritarian states.
The methods, organisations and technologies for the learning and adaptation battle continue to improve, and timescales for adaptation continue to contract. Ukrainian drone units often adapt their software daily and evolve their tactics every 1-2 weeks. Russian and Ukrainian combined-arms tactics evolve every 2-3 months. This highly connected and rapid learning and adaptation environment is providing the stimulus for continuous organisational, doctrinal, and technological innovation.
The prevailing attitude among mid-ranking military officers is that command of operational units is no longer the pathway to promotion, but service in Canberra is.
A large proportion of the learning and adaptation in the war is transparent to outside observers, making the proliferation of lessons – and the potential for learning – much greater. Yet this appears to have had minimal impact on the adaptation of the Australian Defence Force for 21st century military operations.
One of the key changes that has sped up adaption in Ukraine is a closer link between the military front line and production of evolved munitions and equipment. Ukrainian industry representatives spend time at the front to collect insights direct from soldiers, and industry representatives are present for drone mission debriefs to improve the quality of future long-range strike drones. No similar capacity exists within the Australian Department of Defence.
Australia appears to have missed the revolution in uncrewed systems, and counter-drone warfare, which has transpired in the Ukraine war. Indeed, major armed drone programs have been cut by governments in the past five years, and cost cutting imposed on the Army has seen its funding for innovation reduced. The ability to conduct counter-drone operations for deployed forces and critical infrastructure is near zero. The ADF currently deploys few drones and no armed drones. It does, however, remain addicted to small quantities of exquisite and expensive weapon platforms built overseas, such as the Triton uncrewed aircraft. Inflation, which has decreased the purchasing power of Defence’s dollar by more than seven per cent since 2020, has magnified the problem.
But perhaps the most fundamental problem is that Defence lacks a robust learning and adaptation culture suited to the pace of change in the 21st century. Senior defence leaders are not incentivised to take risks, and refer major decisions to committees. The prevailing attitude among mid-ranking military officers is that command of operational units is no longer the pathway to promotion, but service in Canberra is. Decision making, and therefore modernisation, moves at a glacial pace. To be effective in 21st century war, Defence must shift its promotion and incentive structures to ensure there are more of what Andrew Gordon describes in The Rules of the Game as “ratcatchers” and fewer managerial “regulators”.
The likely application of artificial intelligence and human-algorithmic teaming will further accelerate the pace and breadth of military learning and adaptation in the coming years. This is not the revolutionary outcome that observers expected from the Ukraine War. But wars are full of surprises. The Australian Department of Defence must now “learn to learn” better in the contemporary environment. It is a necessary foundation if it is to remain relevant, effective and survivable.
