Beijing agreed to such rules too, when it signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite its subsequent activities in the South China Sea, and when it made international commitments safeguarding Hong Kong’s political autonomy, which it has since abridged, and when it joined the core UN human rights treaties, though it violates them at home.
The rules are not self-enforcing. That’s why, after Moscow’s invasion, the world’s largest economies, except China, moved quickly to disconnect Russia from the benefits of globalisation, including trade, travel, technology and finance. Violating the cardinal principle of international order – the prohibition against violent territorial conquest – must elicit strong counteraction, or Russia’s action today will encourage other would-be aggressors tomorrow.
This, of course, is a world we’ve seen before. The emergence of the post-1945 world order was a direct response to the first half of the 20th century, which saw the two most costly wars in history, the worst economic depression ever, and the rise of autocrats who thought they could conquer the world, or at least large parts of it. The overriding desire of the post-war leaders was to never again repeat that horror. And so the order they fashioned embraces the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, an open international economic system, and fundamental human and democratic rights. The 80 years since its founding have been far better than the 30 years before it.
Defending a liberal international order requires unity and commitment. It entails costs. Before the Russian invasion, such a project seemed unlikely for fractious democracies facing the determined rise of autocratic challengers. Not today.
This commentary draws on Richard Fontaine’s remarks to the Lowy Institute on 13 October. You can watch the event here.