For one, many of these Arab countries, with the notable exception of Qatar, share a similar antipathy towards Hamas and Islamist political forces in general. They would like no better than to see Hamas destroyed for their own security and political ends. Hamas has its roots as a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a longstanding Egyptian Islamist movement that briefly governed Egypt after the 2011 revolution but was deposed by a popularly backed military coup that brought President Fattah El-Sisi into power in 2013. Hamas is designated a terrorist organisation by Egypt and other Sunni Arab states, and they share similar views to Israel that militant Islamist forces pose an existential threat.
There are also other shared security concerns. Despite Egypt’s criticism of Israel on humanitarian grounds, it is refusing to accept Palestinian refugees and fully open the Rafah crossing due to concerns about spillover across its shared border with Israel in the Sinai, where it continues to battle Islamist insurgents. Egypt is unwilling to bear responsibility for a massive Palestinian refugee population, which it fears may harbour militants and could impact future negotiations over Palestinian statehood. The sooner the Israeli military can fulfil its questionable goal of “destroying” Hamas, the sooner Hamas, and militant Islamist movements like it, cease to threaten Egypt and other Sunni Arab states, for they have posed a perennial challenge to Arab autocrats in the region.
There is also the shared concern over Iran and the possibility of the Gaza conflict escalating into a broader regional war. Saudi Arabia and Iran entered into their own détente through a Chinese-sponsored agreement in May. But Iran’s designs on the region and their control and use of proxy actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah and several militias in Iraq and Yemen, remain a serious concern for Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states. Part of Israel’s broader military operations trigged by the Hamas attacks on 7 October included firing warning shots at Hezbollah positions and responding to Hezbollah rocket strikes to deter any further Iranian designs on escalating the conflict via Hezbollah. This not only fends off security threats to Israel, but to the wider region and Sunni Arab neighbours.
Lastly, the promises of long-term strategic and economic benefits from the Abraham Accords are ones its signatories are not willing to let go of quite yet. A senior UAE official went so far as to say that, despite the ongoing conflict in Gaza, “The Accords are our future. It is not an agreement between two governments, but a platform that we believe should transform the region where everyone will enjoy security, stability and prosperity.” For Saudi Arabia, the normalisation process is also linked to a coveted defence security pact with the United States, which supersedes concessions to the Palestinian cause or bowing to popular pressure from the Arab street.
One of the goals of the Hamas terrorist attack was to disrupt the normalisation process and the broader diplomatic and security realignment happening in the region. Hamas has certainly succeeded in kicking sand into the gears. But for now, the benefits of continued realignment outweigh Arab governments’ opposition to Israel’s prosecution of its military campaign.
Main image by Unsplash photographer Chuttersnap.