Defence & security, explained.
Multiple islands and operating locations serve as backup and divert locations in case of conflict (US Coast Guard Photo)
What dispersed basing reveals about US strategic priorities.
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What happens in Micronesia doesn’t stay in MicronesiaWhat happens in Micronesia doesn’t stay in Micronesia
The islands of Micronesia, located in the northwest Pacific, are anything but “micro” when it comes to geopolitics.
In the event of a US-China conflict, US military success is almost certainly dependent on support from frontline allies along the “First Island Chain”, such as Japan and South Korea. At the same time as the United States pursues as much control as possible in these frontline countries, the US is hedging its bets by undertaking a massive military buildup in Micronesia and along the Second Island Chain. This gives Micronesia special relevance among other territories in the region.
In the Second Island Chain, America claims or has negotiated unfettered access, basing and overflight rights. Because none of these islands are safe from an adversary’s attack, the US plan is to “distribute and disperse” its assets. In this strategy, multiple islands and operating locations serve as backup and divert locations in case of conflict.
On top of investing billions into the militarisation of Guam – which China claims could easily be reached with its DF-26 ballistic missile, dubbed “the Guam killer” – the US has been developing airfields in Tinian, Yap, and several other islands, as well as joint-use facilities (airfields and ports) at every location along the Marianas-Palau arc.
The Micronesia Security Monitor, released today by Guam-based think tank the Pacific Centre for Island Security, tracks these developments. It maps the US military’s bases and places along the Marianas-Belau arc, being developed as part of its distributed and dispersed strategy; military exercises in the region; attack assets and their range capabilities; diplomatic activities; foreign aid; economic investments and humanitarian assistance. It shows not only the massive military build-up being undertaken by the United States, but also Chinese actions in the region, such as the many maritime activities being carried out under the guise of so-called “scientific research”.
Experiences along the First and Second Island Chains show that the US is pursuing maximum operational control with minimum diplomatic or political guardrails, and without accountability to local communities and their futures.
Frontline countries in the First Island Chain are increasingly sensitive to China’s activities in the region, and its military buildup, and are reluctant to pre-commit to supporting the US in the event of a conflict. This is leading the US to adopt a more assertive approach there. The US War Department recently said it is “reevaluating” the two-decade old agreement it made with Japan to remove US marines from Okinawa to Guam. Japan has already committed $3.5 billion to this agreement, but to date only 100 marines have been removed. Separately, President Donald Trump recently told South Korea’s president that he wants the United States to take full ownership of lands it currently leases in South Korea, to give American forces more operational flexibility. These actions, among others, signal America’s growing intent to reshape its military posture, prioritising strategic flexibility and unilateral control.
Meanwhile, America’s hard power display along the Second Island Chain unfolds against the backdrop of an increasing nuclear threat. This region already has an unfortunate history with nuclear weapons – in the Marshall Islands alone, 67 nuclear tests were conducted between 1946–58, leaving a legacy of population displacement, radiation exposure, and long-term environmental and health consequences that persist to this day.
Today, American military leaders casually talk about “tactical” nuclear conflict in the region. The volumes of studies on keeping limited nuclear war “limited” are not encouraging. War on the periphery of a nuclear power’s homeland provides a measure of insulation and room for escalation management – essentially turning our islands into a sacrifice zone. This is the kind of calculus that is increasingly a part of Pentagon-funded research and military planning.
A B-2 Spirit bomber at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam (Manasseh Demissie/US Air Force Photo)
What does the US military’s evolving strategy in the First and Second Island Chains reveal about its strategic calculus and preferred mode of operating?
First, the US is seeking expanded operational control in allied territory – such as in South Korea – not only to project power more effectively, but to ensure that any future conflict can be waged far from its own homeland. It is also reinforcing its presence along the Second Island Chain, transforming it into a strategic buffer zone designed to absorb risk, maintain operational continuity, and deter adversaries through distributed basing.
The militarisation of these locations makes them likely targets in the event of war, yet the benefits that the US gains from this access is not reciprocated with protection for civilian populations. Not a single cent of the billions of dollars planned and already spent on the build-up in the region are intended for civilian shelters, food programs, or emergency infrastructure, raising serious questions about how local communities will be protected if conflict erupts.
Experiences along the First and Second Island Chains show that the US is pursuing maximum operational control with minimum diplomatic or political guardrails, and without accountability to local communities and their futures.
Increasingly, those with more power than Guam to make decisions about national security – such as Japan, South Korea and Australia – will be faced with decisions about their defence needs and the pressures of American preferences for “strategic flexibility”.
In the case of Australia, the commitment of Australian subs to US control in the event of war is the rarely mentioned part of the AUKUS deal. If Australia had any doubt about the quid pro quo of American nuclear submarines and commitment to conflict with China, the US Chief of Naval Operations made it clear recently when he said, in the context of Korean nuclear subs, that the commitment to US strategic objectives is seen as a “natural expectation”.
As these dynamics evolve, Australia and other regional partners will need to carefully assess how deeper integration with US defence strategy aligns with their own national interests and long-term security priorities. As these assessments are made, it will be wise to pay attention to the islands of Micronesia. The future arrives early, here.
About the author
Robert Underwood
Dr Robert Underwood was the Guam delegate to the United States House of Representatives from 1993-2003.
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