Article 6 grants members of a Visiting Contingent immunity from arrest, detention and legal proceedings in Solomon Islands for acts performed in the course of, or incidental to, official duties. This covers criminal, civil, disciplinary, administrative and customary law proceedings. Australia or a contributing third state may waive the immunity of its own personnel, and the agreement regulates the exercise of criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction by those states.
Article 22 provides that third-party claims arising from official acts and resulting in property damage, injury or death are handled under Solomon Islands law, including evidence-gathering and the allocation of compensation costs.
The lesson is not that such arrangements are inappropriate. It is that the authority to exercise police powers, operational command, disciplinary control, criminal jurisdiction and responsibility for compensation are distinct matters. Their relationship should be settled before personnel are deployed.
Papua New Guinea’s experience shows why these allocations need constitutional scrutiny. In May 2005, its Supreme Court considered the Enhanced Cooperation between Papua New Guinea and Australia Act 2004 in Special Reference by the Morobe Provincial Executive (SC785) (Opens in new window). The Court unanimously (Opens in new window) found the immunity provisions unconstitutional, including the exclusion of the civil jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea’s courts over acts done in the course of official duties. It led to the withdrawal of the Australian police contingent (Opens in new window).
The decision did not reject international police assistance. It showed that arrangements allowing foreign personnel to exercise public authority must comply with the host state’s constitution. Solomon Islands’ constitutional framework is different, but Article 6 raises a comparable question: how can immunity serve legitimate operational purposes while still leaving an effective avenue for valid claims?
These examples matter as PACPOL moves from design to implementation. A regional policing body is not a supranational police authority. PACPOL will be led by a single Chiefs Leadership Board (Opens in new window) providing strategic oversight, while the powers conferred on foreign personnel will continue to depend on specific deployment agreements.
Three principles deserve attention.
First, the legal basis and limits of cross-border deployments should be clearly established. The powers of visiting personnel and their relationship with the host country’s police and judicial institutions need to be defined in advance.
Second, operational command and legal accountability should be addressed separately. Agreements should identify the authorities responsible for investigating alleged misconduct, exercising criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction, and obtaining and sharing evidence.
Third, individuals affected by the conduct of deployed personnel should have effective procedures for seeking redress. Immunities may serve legitimate operational purposes, but they should not leave valid claims without a legal avenue.
PACPOL is well placed to turn these principles into practice. It could develop model provisions for deployment agreements covering command, jurisdiction, evidence-sharing and claims. It could also encourage member states to establish a regional channel through which people affected by the conduct of deployed personnel can have complaints referred to the appropriate national authorities. This would respect national sovereignty while strengthening mutual confidence.
Cross-border policing needs more than agreement on who may exercise police powers. It requires clarity about who is legally responsible for their exercise. That clarity is not an obstacle to cooperation; it is one of the conditions of its legitimacy.