Beyond monitoring, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat has called for a strong, independent, and well-trained media to combat disinformation, reflecting an instinct toward top-down remedies. At the community level, improving media and information literacy (MIL) has been the default goal, but achieving MIL improvements in the Pacific has proven challenging.
Experience with MIL programs in Africa (Opens in new window) helps explain why they often fall short in the Pacific. Most MIL programs in developing countries have reached journalists and city-based professionals, while the health workers, religious leaders, teachers, and market vendors who carry information through communities – often via the “coconut wireless” – have rarely received systematic support. This is precisely the gap a Pacific approach should avoid repeating.
Treating media and information literacy as democratic infrastructure means building a direct line between the people Pacific communities already trust and the people equipped to verify what they are seeing. This matters most for what institutions are worst placed to catch. Institutional verification works on checkable facts: a date, a record, a source. A bot account built and maintained over months offers none of those – only a community member who knows the terrain well enough can notice something is off.
Establishing that capacity requires training community contacts, drawn from churches, women’s groups, and village councils, in a basic protocol: how to flag a suspicious claim, whom to send it to, and what to tell their community while a check is underway. In Fiji, their reports could feed directly into the monitoring unit established under the MOU between the Elections Office and the Online Safety Commission, giving it visibility into village-level rumour it cannot currently reach alone.
A similar model could resonate across the Pacific and does not rely on slow-moving platform-level moderation in minority languages, or regional treaty processes.
Pacific democracies are only as resilient as the information environment they depend on. Fiji’s experience points to what is required for the Pacific: trained community verification networks operating at the speed disinformation does.