Japan, explained.
Schoolchildren wave Indonesian and French national flags during a welcoming ceremony at Merdeka Palace in Jakarta for French President Emmanuel Macron on 28 May 2025 (Bay Ismoyo/AFP bia Getty Images)
Paris brings territorial legitimacy, EU leverage and military presence that would strengthen any Indo-Pacific grouping.
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Why France must join: Turning the Quintet into a SextetWhy France must join: Turning the Quintet into a Sextet
Ben Bland’s recent article, “Why the United Kingdom and the Indo-Pacific Four should form a new Quintet”, makes an articulate case for deeper coordination among resource-constrained democracies. His argument – that the increasingly unilateral stance of the United States requires its allies to create complementary structures – is both persuasive and timely.
But Bland’s proposed “Quintet” of the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea contains a glaring omission: France. Excluding Paris risks undermining the very logic of the initiative.
France is not merely a European actor, it is an Indo-Pacific power with sovereign territory, military bases, and extensive diplomatic, economic and cultural ties in the region. A coalition seeking credibility, balance, and resilience should not be a Quintet. It should be a Sextet.
This is not about symbolism or European vanity. It is tempting to reduce France to a continental European state bound up in Brussels. The reality is different. France is one of the few genuinely global middle powers, straddling both Europe and the Indo-Pacific in ways even post-Brexit Britain cannot.
Where Britain contributes intelligence and Anglosphere ties, France brings territorial legitimacy, EU linkages, and Indian Ocean anchoring. Together, they would elevate the grouping beyond the sum of its parts.
France governs nearly 1.6 million citizens in the Indo-Pacific, from New Caledonia and French Polynesia to Réunion and Mayotte. These are not colonies but integral parts of the Republic.Thanks to these territories, France holds the world’s second-largest exclusive economic zone, much of it in the Indo-Pacific. Its resources, fisheries, and seabed deposits make Paris a central stakeholder in maritime security.
France also issued its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, years before Britain’s “tilt.” Paris defines itself as a resident power, not a visitor. More than 7,000 French troops are stationed in the Indo-Pacific, with bases from Djibouti to Réunion and New Caledonia. French patrols regularly operate in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean alongside Australian, Japanese and American forces.
Any grouping that claims to coordinate Indo-Pacific strategies but leaves France outside would be structurally incomplete.
Bland’s emphasis on efficiency is understandable. But excluding France would create distortions that weaken the project. A UK-IP4 grouping would tilt heavily toward Northeast Asia and the North Pacific. It would risk overlooking the western Indian Ocean, Africa’s littoral, and Pacific Island states – precisely the arenas where China is expanding influence. France anchors Europe’s presence in these neglected theatres.
France already works trilaterally with Australia, India and Japan. Failing to integrate Paris risks parallel structures that stretch already limited resources.
To include New Zealand, with modest hard-power capabilities and ambiguous China positioning, while excluding France – nuclear-armed, a permanent UN Security Council member, and with troops on the ground – is to erode credibility. For Southeast and South Asian partners, a Sextet would look like a serious, globally anchored coalition. A Quintet risks appearing like an Anglo-Pacific club.
The French Dassault Rafale fighter, which Indonesia has pledged to buy (Ashwin Kumar via WikiMedia Commons)
A Sextet including France would strengthen the grouping across the very dimensions Bland identifies: trade, security, and diplomacy.
France is the world’s seventh-largest economy and the second largest in the European Union. Its EU membership is an advantage, not a handicap. Through Paris, the Sextet could connect Indo-Pacific priorities with the EU’s regulatory and trade clout – arguably the most powerful non-military toolkit in the world. Paris champions environmental standards and digital regulation that shape global markets, giving the grouping broader leverage.
France spends over €47 billion (A$84 billion) annually on defence, comparable to the United Kingdom and far higher than Japan or South Korea. It is a nuclear power, permanent member of the UN Security Council, and consistent naval actor in the Indo-Pacific. French fighter aircraft sales to India and Indonesia and joint exercises with Australia and Japan illustrate its capacity for partnership.
France’s linguistic, cultural and institutional networks stretch across the Indian Ocean, Pacific and Southeast Asia. Paris has co-led the International Solar Alliance with India and invests heavily in climate diplomacy – an issue critical to Pacific Island nations often marginalised in security-first dialogues.
Where Britain contributes intelligence and Anglosphere ties, France brings territorial legitimacy, EU linkages, and Indian Ocean anchoring. Together, they would elevate the grouping beyond the sum of its parts.
Bland suggests that the UK’s post-Brexit independence makes it more suitable than France, which remains inside the European Union. This rests on a false dichotomy.
First, EU membership is not a straitjacket. Paris has intervened militarily in Mali, deepened ties with India, and sent naval assets to the Pacific – all under its own flag.
Second, EU leverage is a multiplier, not a burden. An Indo-Pacific coalition disconnected from Brussels would lack relevance on trade, digital and climate issues where the European Union sets global standards.
Third, selective exclusion damages legitimacy. Suggesting that the United Kingdom is preferable because it is outside the European Union makes the project look political rather than strategic. Asian partners value capability and commitment, not institutional status. France offers both.
If the challenge is as cross-cutting as Bland argues, the response must be equally integrated. A Sextet would achieve this. Meeting outside NATO, perhaps on the sidelines of ASEAN gatherings, the group could organise around three themes:
Far from diluting efficiency, a Sextet would avoid redundancy and bring coherence to the web of trilaterals and plurilaterals already in play.
Bland is right to argue for creative minilaterals beyond Washington’s orbit. But limiting the idea to a Quintet undermines its potential. France is not a peripheral European actor but a resident Indo-Pacific power with territory, military presence, and global diplomatic weight. To exclude it is to ignore both reality and opportunity.
The Quintet is clever. The Sextet is necessary.
About the author
Lindsay R. Dodd
Dr Lindsay Robert Dodd is a Hanoi-based senior business consultant with more than three decades of experience advising leaders and organizations through transformation and strategic renewal.
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