Why the United Kingdom and the Indo-Pacific Four should form a new Quintet

These five resource-constrained democracies face shared challenges that require coordination beyond existing alliance structures.

Ben Bland

22 August 20254 min read

I know what you’re thinking, fellow researchers and diplomats. “Please, not another minilateral.” I feel your pain, believe me. But hear me out on this one. This is no MIKTA.

As the United States moves in a more unilateral and transactional direction, the United Kingdom and NATO’s four Indo-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – should establish a new Quintet meeting, where they can discuss and coordinate positions on a wide range of cross-cutting, shared interests from trade to defence and alliance management to China.

There is an increasing confluence of interests between these five democracies, and US allies, that would be well served by the creation of a forum for their senior officials and/or elected leaders to meet on an annual basis.

NATO, the transatlantic defence alliance, first invited the leaders of the so-called Indo-Pacific Four to its annual summit in 2022, and it has been intensifying cooperation with the IP4 since, reflecting a fusion of defence concerns and priorities across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

At the same time, post-Brexit Britain has been boosting its connections in the Indo-Pacific, joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional trade agreement, becoming a Dialogue Partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, forming one leg of AUKUS, and deepening its bilateral partnerships with Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Cooperation is moving from a nice-to-have to a must-have.

All five nations believe in maintaining a rules-based multilateral system, which is under threat from both Washington and Beijing. All five are staunch US allies that know they will have to do and pay more for their own security in the coming years, whether a Democrat or Republican is in the White House. All five want to expand their partnerships with emerging powers in Southeast and South Asia. All five want to find ways to promote democratic and accountable governance, without believing they can enforce their views on others. But all five are resource constrained, in terms of finances and diplomatic and military personnel.

In this environment, cooperation is moving from a nice-to-have to a must-have. Given limited money, time and political capital, any new initiative needs to add value. A Quintet meeting would definitely do so, given the overlapping concerns and interests of these countries and their need to find more truly like-minded partners.

The meeting should take place outside NATO, because the main justification is to build a dialogue that encompasses defence and security as well as economics, technology and the global order, acknowledging how these issues are increasingly interlinked. One possible option would be to meet on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, which is attended by the United Kingdom and the IP4 as Dialogue Partners.

Why, you might rightly ask, the United Kingdom and not other European nations? Partly, because this recommendation comes out of a policy paper I recently published for Chatham House arguing that the United Kingdom needs to make the Indo-Pacific a higher priority.

But, more seriously, there is a strong case for the IP4 to start this dialogue with the United Kingdom because it is an independent trading nation, like them, rather than a member of a large trading bloc, like France and Germany, as well as a significant diplomatic, military and intelligence power in its own right.

Some of these five countries already sit together in a range of other overlapping initiatives and organisations. All but New Zealand are in the G20. All but South Korea are in the CPTPP, and Seoul is considering joining. The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are in the Five Eyes intelligence partnership.

Why, you might also ask, exclude the United States? Simply because these countries already have ample opportunities to engage Washington and there is a shared national interest in expanding cooperation between key US allies, without the United States in the room.

All successful diplomatic initiatives require a mix of top-down political will and bottom-up policy implementation. The Quintet should start with a ministerial meeting, build a truly strategic conversation, and then scope specific areas for meaningful cooperation. Officials should consider coordinating development assistance, finding practical ways to support a predictable and rules-based trading system, and better aligning approaches to maritime security in Asia.

The Quintet will not solve problems alone. But it could be a catalyst to intensify the cooperation between these five nations, capitalising on their extensive shared interests and worries.

About the author

Ben Bland

Ben Bland is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House.

Topics

Japan South Korea Australia United Kingdom New Zealand