China, explained.
China’s President Xi Jinping might try to keep his distance from a potentially unproductive encounter (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
Japan’s blunt words on Taiwan froze relations with China a year ago, and Beijing still won’t blink.
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When it comes to Japan, China finds it hard to think straightWhen it comes to Japan, China finds it hard to think straight
China–Japan ties have been in deep freeze for more than a year now since Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi acknowledged (Opens in new window) in November 2025 that the use of force against Taiwan “could constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan, a form of words implying Japan would intervene militarily.
China reacted quickly, launching a campaign of vehement criticism, even claiming (Opens in new window) Japan was planning to return to the militarism of the 1930s and recolonise Taiwan. Political contact between Beijing and Tokyo was disrupted, as were cultural ties, tourism and trade, including Chinese exports of rare earth magnets and items with potential military uses.
China shows no sign of softening its position. On 6 November 2026, its Foreign Ministry spokesperson reiterated (Opens in new window) demands that Japan “correct the erroneous words and deeds on the Taiwan question, adopt a correct attitude on historical issues, and form an objective and rational perception on China”.
On one level, what Takaichi said was unremarkable, albeit more candid than is usual for a Japanese leader. US politicians have said similar things. But China has difficulty thinking straight when it comes to Japan. The intensity of its reaction can be explained by several factors:
No Japanese backdown has materialised. Tokyo has calmly stood its ground, while leaving open the door for dialogue.
China shows no interest in moving on. It has long sustained the legacy of Japan’s 1930s aggression as a bilateral pressure point, exploiting Tokyo’s awkwardness in acknowledging its past, and prodding South Korea and now others, like Russia, to join in.
China’s propaganda machinery operates in an echo chamber. It is adept at targeting a victim, but not suited to self-awareness or self-correction. Its rhetoric about resurgent militarism is overblown and ridiculous. The Japanese leaders who ought to have done more in facing up to the past have long since departed. It is futile to expect their successors to go any further, especially when their accusers hint at revenge while concealing their own more contemporary atrocities.
Beijing may have decided to wait Takaichi out. This is not without risk: while Japanese prime ministers usually turn over within two years, there are exceptions, notably Shinzo Abe, whose policy and ideological mantle Takaichi has inherited. Who is to say that Beijing’s pressure campaign will not serve to strengthen her politically? In the meantime, with a weakened US administration, Beijing would better win over this important neighbour, rather than humiliate it.
The upcoming regional summits – East Asia (16–17 November), APEC (18–19 November) and G20 (14–15 December) – offer potential for an initial rapprochement between leaders. The East Asia Summit might be more likely, since China is represented there by its premier, rather than its president, allowing President Xi Jinping to keep his distance from a potentially unproductive encounter. Otherwise, no immediate circuit-breaker is in sight.
A highway without off-ramps is no better than a cul-de-sac.
Words matter. Just because something is true does not mean it needs to be said, especially by a national leader. There are less damaging ways for Tokyo to convey to Beijing its determination regarding security in its immediate region. Takaichi’s explicitness was unnecessary and an unforced misstep.
A highway without off-ramps is no better than a cul-de-sac. Beijing’s hardline rhetoric may play well domestically, but its intransigence seems to rule out the kind of accommodation it claims to seek with Japan. Backdowns are difficult for any government, especially in a democracy. Japan–China ties look set to remain permanently prickly.
About the author
Graham Fletcher
Graham Fletcher is Senior Fellow for East Asia at the Lowy Institute and a former Australian Ambassador to China.
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