Intelligence & security, explained.
Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, the world’s most valuable company that provides the core technology for the West’s technological competition with China (Joyce N. Boghosian/Official White House Photo)
Trump knew about Huang’s Chinese contact months before the public did, and Washington has no rulebook for cases like it.
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Jensen Huang’s affair exposes Silicon Valley’s national security powerJensen Huang’s affair exposes Silicon Valley’s national security power
The blue tsunami of the midterms had barely landed onshore when yet another crisis hit the Trump administration.
On 8 November, Jensen Huang admitted (Opens in new window) to an affair. American intelligence agencies, according (Opens in new window) to the New York Times, have concluded that his mistress is an intelligence asset for China’s Ministry of State Security.
News of the affair shocked markets and regulators. Huang leads Nvidia, the world’s most valuable company that provides the core technology for the West’s technological competition with China. He is deeply tied with the American political apparatus, flying on Air Force One with President Donald Trump for his state visit to Beijing earlier in the year.
Huang’s affair shows a new contradiction at the heart of Washington’s relationship to Silicon Valley. Private executives have more power than ever, while the institutions designed to protect America’s national security haven’t adapted to that change.
National security apparatuses are set up to protect sensitive information. They also protect government decision-makers from influence efforts. The threat against Huang centred on the potential for China to influence Nvidia’s position on selling AI chips to China, rather than control of any particular item of classified information.
The leaders of major American technology firms are becoming structurally decisive figures in American national security policy.
Governments around the world gain reasons every day to treat people like Jensen Huang as key geopolitical figures.
In September, the Pentagon named (Opens in new window) SpaceX and Tesla chief Elon Musk and Anduril Industries founder Palmer Luckey, alongside former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, as the leaders of Project Meridian. The three will guide the future of American warfare, including acquisition of hundreds of billions of dollars of equipment.
In December 2025, Huang himself told (Opens in new window) CSIS, “our nation’s extraordinary technology industry is part of our national security”. His company, which controls 80–85% of the global market (Opens in new window) for AI chip hardware, positions itself at the vanguard of American power through its grip on the infrastructure.
Silicon Valley executives are giving themselves the job of shaping America’s national security interests rather than delivering what the government requests – in turn influencing how the world sees American power.
When Musk throttled Starlink access to Ukraine’s soldiers, speculation abounded about who authorised the slowdown between Musk or Trump. The question itself proved the point, that critical decisions may be made on either side of the sector wall.
In Brazil’s presidential election, thousands of protestors gathered outside of Meta’s Sao Paolo office to decry what they saw as the company meddling in their election. In the months prior, the President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s campaign released evidence (Opens in new window) that Meta’s platforms were promoting his opponent’s campaign and limiting Lula’s ability to reach voters. Meta accepted the result but denied any political intention behind it. The reputational damage had been done: a majority of Brazilians believe that American technology poses a risk to their national security.
A Silicon Valley executive who controls technology used by military and intelligence services may not have access to classified information, but can make consequential decisions about how the technology operates.
These companies, deeply tied to the Trump White House and at the vanguard of its definition of American power, are producing consequences that have a significance that rivals that of entire governments.
Governments around the world gain reasons every day to treat people like Jensen Huang as key geopolitical figures. This scandal shows that counterintelligence services need to account for that reality.
The FBI, the key counterintelligence service in the United States, has some efforts in place to protect private industry. They investigate attempts by foreign governments to infiltrate critical companies. Their goal is to protect classified information and hardware that could be stolen and repurposed.
As the public role that these executives play changes, so too does the problem of counterintelligence defence. A Silicon Valley executive who controls the technology used by military and intelligence services around the world may not themselves have access to classified information, but they can make consequential decisions about how the technology operates. These decisions could change what a country is capable of doing, or what technology an adversary is able to access.
Beyond the question of the appropriate counterintelligence protection for figures like Huang, there also comes the question of their political relationships.
Well before the public was made aware, Trump was informed (Opens in new window) about Huang’s relationship, including the intelligence community’s assessment that his mistress was tied to Chinese intelligence. Even after those briefings, Trump continued to speak with Huang and, once the scandal was revealed, publicly defended him.
Even once counterintelligence services adapt to the moving future, they can always be countermanded by chief executives who make political calculations about figures. Trump could have pushed Huang out, but in doing so would have alienated a key political ally, someone central to his strategic competition with China. Huang’s embrace of MAGA has also been helpful to Trump in building a political and economic support base in Silicon Valley.
The decision to do nothing with the information developed by the FBI was a political one, made because Trump saw Huang as indispensable.
This dynamic matters for every country that relies on American technology in both its civilian and public sectors. These new vulnerabilities will not stop at American borders.
The new generation of leaders taking centre stage in the United States must grapple with the seemingly insurmountable power that Silicon Valley has accumulated in the Trump era. Backlash to that very group was part of the substantial rebuke delivered by voters.
In governing, these new leaders from both parties will have to reimagine national security – including counterintelligence – to cover the public power now wielded by private actors.
About the author
Cory Alpert
Cory Alpert is a PhD researcher at the University of Melbourne, where he studies the impact of AI on democracy. Previously, he served in the Biden White House for three years and as the senior adviser to Mayor Steve Benjamin.
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