The optics of such a meeting – even if a photo-op is the only result – might backfire against China, and Beijing seems to be aware of this risk (Joyce N. Boghosian/White House, Ricardo Stuckert/Palácio do Planalto, Sergei Bobylev, TASS/Kremlin)

Yalta 2.0: A Trump-Xi-Putin summit has little upside for Beijing

A trilateral summit lets Washington look powerful, but it could cost Beijing dearly with Europe.

Alicja Bachulska

10 November 20264 min read

Beijing might be uneasy about the prospects of a potential trilateral meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of APEC summit set to be held in Shenzhen on 18–19 November 2026. The trilateral, already deemed “Yalta 2.0” by observers, was first brought forward by Moscow, with Washington expressing openness – but mainly about denuclearisation, not Ukraine – and Beijing remaining tellingly quiet. And although China has since moved from total silence to acknowledging that the three powers are discussing such a meeting (Opens in new window), the level of uncertainty surrounding the topic is notable.

Observers have warned that by even entertaining the premise, the three leaders endorse the idea that great powers may decide smaller countries’ fate among themselves (Opens in new window), and that the summit could show Washington’s diplomatic reach but also expose the growing gap between America’s power and credibility (Opens in new window). Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote on X (Opens in new window) that “the first Yalta recognised Soviet domination over the areas of Eastern Europe that the Red Army controlled” but “now, Putin wants Ukrainian territories that he can’t manage to conquer as a gift”.

As Sikorski hinted, “Yalta 2.0” is impossible: not merely because the three powers do not share the same strategic calculus in trying to carve out their spheres of influence under current geopolitical conditions, but because third countries have their own capabilities and agency, as wartime Ukraine and Iran have clearly demonstrated.

It will be a very difficult balancing act to deconflict the interests of all three parties involved.

Beijing appears aware of these dynamics and is seeking to find a way through these risky waters in a manner that maximises its gains while minimising potential losses.

Opposition to so-called “cold war mentality” (Opens in new window) and “zero-sum games” (Opens in new window) has been at the core of China’s diplomatic narratives for decades. They have been instrumentalised as building blocks strengthening the perception of China being a force for peace and stability, opposing power politics and bigger actors bullying smaller. While in practice Beijing might not have been faithful to these lofty ideals, they are nevertheless key to China’s “discourse power” (Opens in new window) – the ability to shape the way China is portrayed and perceived around the world through amplification of certain positions and erasure of those deemed unfavourable by the authorities.

In this context, optics of such a meeting – even if a photo-op is the only result – might backfire against China, and Beijing seems to be aware of this risk – hence the restraint. The same applies to Beijing’s willingness – or the lack thereof – to discuss Washington’s preferred topic, namely nuclear arms control. As noted by Sun Chenghao (Opens in new window) from Tsinghua University, “placing it [China] within the same reduction framework risks turning unequal capabilities into nominally equal responsibilities”, given that Beijing’s nuclear capabilities are still behind those of the US and Russia.

A building in Suzhou, Jiangsu, lit up ahead of the APEC summit, which China will host in Shenzhen on 18–19 November (John July/Unsplash)

Beijing also seems to be aware that such a meeting could ruin its already deteriorating relationship with Europe. Even if only symbolic rather than substantive in nature, the very fact of providing the space for the trilateral meeting would reinforce the perception that China is helping to bypass Europe in discussions on issues crucial to its future, especially on the war in Ukraine.

Over the past year, Europe has been going through a rapid process of coming to terms with the systemic nature and scale of the “second China shock”, with China’s industrial overcapacity flooding the European market, risking its deindustrialisation. Unlike the first shock after China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation, this one involves advanced, security-relevant products such as electric vehicles, solar panels, advanced machinery and telecoms.

The numbers are quite telling: according to local reports (Opens in new window), EU trade deficit with China hit a record €425 billion in 2025, with €87 billion lost from European industry because of unfair competition with China. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) has branded the situation “critical” (Opens in new window). In October, France and Germany – two major players for years divided on their respective China policies – called for a new tool (Opens in new window) allowing the EU to immediately restrict China’s access to the European single market. The continent is feeling the squeeze, and it is preparing for a protracted period of economic competition, and even potentially a trade war with Beijing. And what China needs is continued, relatively unimpeded entry to that market, where it can continue to channel its industrial overcapacity with relatively few obstacles so far.

In the context of the potential trilateral meeting in Shenzhen, Beijing should know that it could easily antagonise Europe even further, pushing it further down the escalatory path. This has been acknowledged by Chinese analysts and commentators, such as Wang Wen from Renmin University, who noted that a trilateral dialogue would deepen “strategic anxiety” (Opens in new window) in Europe and among other close partners of the US such as Japan.

It will be a very difficult balancing act to deconflict the interests of all three parties involved. Russia wants the recognition that comes with the format, the US wants arms control, while China would not mind the broker image but without any actual costs or concessions associated with the demands of either of the powers. If the meeting takes place, it will most likely focus on reiterating the positions of the three countries involved rather than seeking concrete solutions to the problems they face.

About the author

Alicja Bachulska

Alicja Bachulska is a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Topics

Diplomacy China United States Russia Europe