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China
About the author
Ryan Neelam
Ryan Neelam was Director of the Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Program at the Lowy Institute. He led the flagship annual Lowy Institute Poll, was project director for the Global Diplomacy Index, and wrote about climate diplomacy and multilateral policy.
The last five years have been a difficult period in Australia’s relations with China. Australian governments have been more public and forthright in voicing their concerns about the Chinese government’s intentions and behaviour in the region. China has sought to punish Australia for perceived transgressions, including through a range of measures blocking trade. For much of this period, high-level contact between the two countries was frozen.
The past 12 months, however, have seen a stabilisation of the relationship. Following the Albanese government coming to power, ministerial contact between the Chinese and Australian governments has resumed. In the months prior to this Poll being conducted, Australian and Chinese leaders and their foreign, trade and defence ministers had met in person or virtually for the first time in years. In more recent months, Chinese restrictions on some Australian products have eased and there have been signs of progress on other trade blockages.
Australians were asked what they thought of the relative improvement in relations. More than half (56%) say the resumption of ministerial contact is either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ positive for Australia’s national interests. The remainder are split between those who say it will have ‘no impact’ (21%) and those who say it will have either a ‘very negative’ or ‘somewhat negative’ impact (20%) on Australia’s national interests.
The improved atmosphere in the bilateral relationship coincides with a shift in the way Australians view China. The Lowy Institute Poll tracks whether Australians see China as more of an economic partner or as more of a security threat to Australia. This year, the number who see China as more of a security threat is down 11 points from 2022 to a bare majority (52%). Correspondingly, the number who see China as more of an economic partner (44%) is up 11 points from last year.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that about half of Australians continue to see China as more of a security threat than as an economic partner — in contrast with the situation just three years ago. In 2020, the dominant view was that China was more of an economic partner (55%), while only 41% saw it as more of a security threat.
Moreover, when they look to the future, a strong majority (75%) of Australians continue to believe it is ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years — unchanged from 2022 (75%), and significantly higher than in 2018 (45%).
The vast majority of Australians (87%) say they are ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Islands country. While the overall result is the same as for a similar question asked in 2022 (88%), the number who say they are ‘very concerned’ fell by 18 points.
In a different question posed in 2019, a smaller majority of Australians (55%) said China opening a military base in a Pacific Islands country would pose a critical threat to Australia’s vital interests in the next ten years.
