Yes, China does seek hegemony

A recent Interpreter article by Jennifer Hsu (Opens in new window) argued that China is not “seeking to become a hegemon”. I disagree.

The regime in Beijing rejects the idea of ever acquiring hegemony, owing to its allegedly unique national characteristics. But its behaviour suggests otherwise. China plainly wants to win, in everything, and displace (if not actually replace) the United States from its global leadership role.

China displays ambitions which, if realised, will constitute hegemony. Or at least a type of hegemony, one which would be less orderly, given its reluctance to take on responsibility for the global commons.

China’s ambitions are large. No matter what field of endeavour – engineering, science and technology, manufacturing, military capability, AI or space – the regime aims at the commanding heights, combining Stakhanovite determination with Teutonic thoroughness. It has a can-do confidence derived from its recent rapid growth, organisational prowess, the supposed secret sauce of “scientific socialism” blended with “ancient Chinese wisdom”, its economic weight and population size, and the West’s disarray.

China tells the Global South that its experience constitutes an alternative, non-Western path to modernity. Its propaganda speaks of creating a “great miracle in the history of human development” and a “new form of human civilisation”.

Moving beyond the material, China now wants to develop an autonomous knowledge system, a corpus of philosophy and social sciences independent of Western ideas (the irony of Marxism’s European origins is ignored).

In short, wherever possible, China aims to reach the top.

Claims that China is different and will not deploy power like others are not borne out by its behaviour.

All countries seek to maximise their interests but China is unusually exacting in this regard. Its self-proclaimed “core interests” are non-negotiable. It is unembarrassed about exploiting bilateral leverage, linking economic carrots and sticks to political demands. In China’s bilateral dealings it raises the bar ever higher, such as by tightening what it is prepared to tolerate under its “one China” policy umbrella.

In the past, China exerted pressure mainly behind closed doors, but now it is less subtle. Copying the United States, it has developed mechanisms to sanction foreign firms, individuals and governments. During Covid it sought to place political conditions on exports of medical supplies. Now it weaponises its near monopoly on rare earths, with Japan’s defence industrial complex currently a target (Opens in new window).

Compromise is seen as the last resort rather than a fair and worthwhile objective. Take the South China Sea. This group of islets and reefs spread between the notional EEZs of several states, claimed in whole or in part by six governments and with no native inhabitants, should be ideal for a negotiated settlement, a big soft power plus for Beijing. But China has resolved that its claims alone will prevail. It is determined to possess these waters come what may: rejecting legitimate international arbitration, investing in massive facilities and deployments to dominate the physical space, and working up legal argumentation that would restrict the application of international law there.

China acts assertively to extend domestic jurisdiction offshore, pressuring foreign governments to repatriate fugitives and where feasible sending its own personnel to do so directly.

Chinese law already applies to Chinese citizens worldwide; Beijing is starting to expand this concept to foreigners.Two examples: the Hong Kong National Security Law of 2020 has global coverage, and the new law to Promote Ethnic Unity and Progress applies to “organisations and individuals outside China who engage in acts undermining ethnic unity and progress, or who create ethnic divisions”.

China is similarly ambitious in trying to silence dissenting voices overseas. It protests, blocks and sanctions politicians, journalists and academics who contradict its narrative. Its Confucius Institutes were intended to shape the teaching of China studies in foreign universities (ultimately with limited success).

China challenges Western media’s dominant “discourse power” by investing lavishly in Chinese alternatives and spreading China-friendly content widely in Global South outlets.

China seeks to chisel away at the status quo of US leadership, promoting its “global initiatives”, which would dismantle US alliances and bases, seeking to expand the BRICS into a Global South cheer squad for Chinese objectives, collaborating with those most antagonistic to Washington (Russia, North Korea, Iran et al) and proclaiming the “East is rising and the West is in decline”.

China is by no means unusual in how it lobbies and exerts pressure. Its practices largely mirror those of others, especially the United States. That is the point: China is no different and can be expected to be no different. Given its record whilst possessing a modest set of tools, can it be doubted that if ever its lofty ambitions are realised, it will seek to “do what great powers do” and fill out the role of hegemon?