China, explained.
US President Donald Trump is guided off the stage after his speech during a state banquet with China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, 14 May 2026 (Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)
The Xi–Trump summit revealed less about dealmaking than about Beijing’s quiet confidence – to anchor the system, not merely react to it.
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China, centre stageChina, centre stage
The Xi-Trump summit in Beijing this month, immediately followed by Vladimir Putin’s visit, offers a window into China’s self-image. If these meetings revealed anything it was a continued insistence that power need not be exercised as hegemony. Rather than proclaiming primacy, Xi Jinping sought to reiterate China’s core interests while offering co-existence.
China sees itself as an equal partner to the United States in international affairs. However, observers should not mistake that as seeking to become hegemon. Like Washington, Beijing has prioritised its core national interests – sovereignty, security and development – above all else. As Xi has explained in his thoughts on diplomacy, these core interests are China’s redlines, and thus, they both structure and constrain China’s foreign policy.
Comparing the briefing from China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi with the White House factsheet about the outcomes of the leader’s summit demonstrates the muted nature in which China sees such engagement. Rather than providing a laundry list of wins, as the US sought to do, China showed it was playing a long game. The thinking on the Chinese side is that as long as positive dynamics are generated in the interaction – not necessarily quantifiable announceables – then the patience invested in the relationship will be rewarded down the road. What the US factsheet indicates – at least for this administration – is the desire to see such summits as the place where big deals and breakthroughs happen.
Neither an aspiring hegemon nor a passive balancer, Beijing projects confidence in shaping outcomes while insisting on coexistence on its own terms.
The contrast is telling. While the US chases grand gestures and announceables, China is quietly cementing itself as the central node of great‑power politics. For decades, the US sat at the apex of the “great triangle”, balancing between China, the former Soviet Union and, now, Russia. Today, that equation has flipped. Both Trump and Putin have felt compelled to go to Beijing seeking guarantees, stabilisation and strategic signalling – even as they encounter each other elsewhere.
China is not trying to play Washington and Moscow against each other. Instead, it is positioning itself as the core of the international system. China’s influence rests less on military power than on confidence in engaging both the US and Russia on its own terms.
China’s drive for self-sufficiency and economic security has strained relations with trading partners, but this reflects a long-standing priority: core interests come above all else. Self-reliance is not new. The Communist Party first invoked it in the late 1930s during the war against Japan. In recent decades, Beijing has embedded the concept across agriculture, manufacturing and technology through initiatives such as Made in China 2025 and the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plans.
China’s prioritisation of its core interests has fuelled tensions across the global trading system, prompting tariffs and accusations of dumping. Yet China remains resilient: as the world’s second-largest economy, it posted a US$1.2 trillion surplus last year while reducing dependence on the United States.
Unloading imported iron ore at Qingdao Port, Shandong Province, China, 27 May 2026 (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)
For middle powers like Australia, adapting to today’s geopolitical environment is growing harder. Diversifying away from China is hard when China remains both a dominant market and a more selective trading partner.
Iron ore captures this structural constraint. China depends heavily on Australian supply, but Australia has few alternative markets of comparable scale. At the same time, Beijing’s investment in Guinea’s Simandou iron ore project and its prolonged negotiations with firms such as BHP reflect its determination to secure advantage and reshape pricing on terms that serve its core interests. For Australia, the dilemma is how to diversify away from China and build flexibility when its largest export is tied to a market with few substitutes and growing in bargaining power.
In the span of a week hosting the US and Russian leaders, Beijing quietly rewrote the choreography of great‑power politics. Xi showed that China no longer reacts to the system – it is the anchor. Neither an aspiring hegemon nor a passive balancer, Beijing projects confidence in shaping outcomes while insisting on coexistence on its own terms. For others, the message is clear: engaging China now means adjusting to a world where it increasingly sets the pace and parameters.
About the author
Jennifer Hsu
Jennifer Y.J. Hsu is Associate Professor and Program Director of Research and Policy at the Whitlam Institute, Western Sydney University. She was previously working in the Australian Public Service on minerals and resources policy.
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