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Russia’s power in Asia is rebounding, aided by support from authoritarian partners North Korea and China.
Susannah Patton
Susannah Patton is Director, Asia Engagement at RMIT and a Nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
Jack Sato
Jack Sato is a Data Analyst for the Asia Power Index at the Lowy Institute.
Topics
Russia recorded a small improvement to its comprehensive power for the first time since 2019, and overtook Australia to regain fifth place in the 2025 Asia Power Index, a position it had lost in 2024. Russia’s comeback was not caused by any one single factor, but by improving performance in all measures except cultural influence.
Russia’s economy continues to grow, albeit at a slow rate, a phenomenon described by analysts as “Fortress Russia”, referring to Moscow’s ability to wear the costs of war and sanctions. Russia also continues to score highly for its resilience, a reflection of its relative security in terms of resources, geoeconomics, and geopolitics compared to many countries in Asia, and a partial explanation for why Russia has been able to weather large-scale international sanctions.
Moscow’s war footing also means that it continues to record improvements in some sub-measures of military capability due to its continued high level of defence spending and expansion of its armed forces, with experts in our survey noting the impact of battlefield experience on Russia’s capabilities. Notably, however, Russia did not record improvements in terms of either its weapons and platforms or signature capabilities: equipment losses and a focus on sustaining the war in Ukraine have distracted its focus from investment in military modernisation and building next-generation systems.
Russia has limited economic relationships with most countries in Asia, a constraint on its strategy to position itself as a great power in the region. Despite rising two places for this measure in 2025, it still ranks 17th, behind Brunei. This positive trend was mostly due to continued growth in trade between Russia and China, which reached US$244 billion in 2024, representing 35 per cent of Russia’s trade with the world, up from 19 per cent in 2022.
Russia’s diplomatic influence grew slightly in 2025, for the first time since 2021, though it remains below the level prior to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Its rising diplomatic influence comes as it has invested more effort over the past two years in high-level diplomacy with important Asian countries, including China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
Russia’s defence networks were also stronger in 2025, largely due to its new alliance partnership with North Korea (see box opposite).
One contributing factor to Russia’s resurgence as a power in Asia is growing cooperation among authoritarian powers, including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. This was highlighted prominently in 2025 by China’s Victory Day Parade, attended by the leaders of all four countries, as well as those from dozens of other countries.
The sharpest manifestation of this trend is Russia’s new alliance with North Korea, formalised in 2024, which has continued to strengthen in 2025. An estimated 11,000 North Korean troops are fighting in support of Russia’s war on Ukraine. While this number is modest in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war, it has symbolic and political significance as the third-largest troop deployment from or to any country in Asia (the first- and second-largest deployments are US forces stationed in Japan and South Korea). The full extent of Russia’s covert military assistance to North Korea is not reflected in our data, which is drawn from international open sources. But the improvement in North Korea’s own missile capabilities is likely in part attributable to support from Russia, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency.
Russia’s defence partnership with China has also strengthened: the two countries are top partners for each other in terms of both defence dialogues and combined trainings. Asia Power Index data covering 2023 and 2024 shows that China became a relatively more important partner for Russia in 2024, with exercises held with China accounting for 47 per cent of all Russia’s combined military exercises with Index countries, compared with just 15 per cent in 2023.
