The US Army lost against Ukraine but would Australia do any better?

What defeated the American brigade in Germany was not just new technology. Miniaturised sensors, cheap drones and munitions played a part, but the failure of the American brigade was also human. It was a failure of humility and leadership. It was just the latest in a long series of unheeded warnings to Western military organisations (Opens in new window) about the changing character of war.

The question for the Australian government is: would an Australian military force fare any better? The answer, based on my observations of the Army, its senior leadership and government policy, is a resounding “no”.

For almost five years, a profound learning opportunity has been presented to Australia by the war in Ukraine, as well as by operations in the Middle East. Only in the past year has the Defence Department begun to formally study the lessons from Ukraine. Only this year in the 2026 National Defence Strategy (Opens in new window) has the government openly acknowledged that there are lessons to learn from Ukraine. But where the utility of drones has been accepted, Defence has preferred small quantities of complex and expensive systems. This has done little to enhance military capacity and does not provide the mass the ADF needs to deter threats or respond to aggression.

China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has invested heavily in drones. An Australian Army task force operating against the PLA in the Pacific would face a denser and more capable sensor and strike network than Nemesis fielded in Germany.

And the harsh reality for Australia is that the threat begins before the army leaves home.

There is a common phrase now used by the Australian Army: Fight Tonight (Opens in new window). But Australia’s military will not be able to fight tonight if it cannot survive tonight. Why would China fight a military force already deployed forward when it can more cheaply destroy key military forces in their bases in a series of Operation Spiderweb (Opens in new window) type attacks? With drones available at malls and using explosives stolen from mining sites, mounting such an operation on Australian soil would be relatively simple.

But let’s assume that an Australian task force could deploy overseas. How vulnerable are the aircraft and ships carrying them to attacks by drones? And, if the Australian force makes it to land, Army units have very limited drone detection, and interception, capabilities, let alone the offensive drones now responsible for up to 90% of Russian casualties in Ukraine (Opens in new window). To be fair, there are vast distances between some of the areas the ADF might operate in the Pacific, which will change some drone operating methods. But in their operating areas, particularly on the many islands of the first and second island chains as well as in the South Pacific, short-range tactical drones are almost certain to loom large in the arsenal of a potential adversary, especially PLA ground forces.

The Army’s vulnerabilities are structural as much as technical. Army training still features very small numbers of drones and counter-drone systems. Counter-drone skills are not yet a foundational discipline on the same level as marksmanship and combat behaviours. There are no dedicated ranges that replicate persistent, layered drone threats. The Army also lacks anything resembling Ukraine's dedicated Unmanned Systems Forces, let alone drone units in battalions, brigades or the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

Without rapid action on drones and counter-drone equipment, new doctrine and training, and the new drone units that are essential to new ways of war, a future Army deployment into the region is likely to suffer the same fate as the American brigade in Germany.

What is to be done?

First, the Australian Army should make counter-drone and drone employment a core competency, to be trained and assessed to the same standard as weapons handling. Training exercises must be designed and executed around persistent overhead surveillance and attrition.

Second, Defence must undertake organisational reform. The evidence from Ukraine is that combat units need their own drone organisations. Army units urgently need drone platoons (and eventually companies) for defence, attack, reconnaissance, logistics and casualty evacuation. Brigades need their own drone unit for deeper surveillance, interdiction and counter-drone operations. But an army-level drone force is also required. For this, an army reserve brigade should be re-roled into an autonomous warfare brigade. Roles would include force generation, industry liaison, learning and adaptation as well as strategic functions like deep strike.

Third, dispersal, hardening, concealment and signature management (referring to the visual, electronic and heat “signature” that can be detected by an enemy) need to be funded as core Army capabilities. This extends from camouflage discipline down to the hardening and dispersal of the northern bases and logistics nodes that any Pacific operation would rely on.

The exercise in Germany was a training activity, and the American brigade that lost will learn and adapt. The Australian Army has the opportunity to watch and adapt before it has to learn under fire. It has all the knowledge it needs to move rapidly to transform itself now. Army leaders need to take more risks and act more quickly.

Mick Ryan is a consultant to a number of defence and security companies, including drone company Skydio.