North Korea, explained.
A photo released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on 2 February 2026 (KCNA via Getty Images)
Pyongyang has already got what it wanted from Russia’s war.
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Kyiv’s warnings of tens of thousands more North Korean troops never came trueKyiv’s warnings of tens of thousands more North Korean troops never came true
In November 2024, a month after North Korea sent the first batch of 12,000 (Opens in new window) troops to Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed (Opens in new window) that Pyongyang could send up to 100,000 troops. Zelenskyy doubled down (Opens in new window) on this claim in December after North Korea was reported to have suffered from 3,000 casualties. In July 2025, Ukraine was reported to be anticipating (Opens in new window) another 30,000 North Korean troops more to bolster Russia’s defence. In August this year, Zelenskyy revised his estimate once more, saying he now expected (Opens in new window) 50,000 North Korean soldiers to be deployed to Russia.
But the problem with Ukraine’s forecasts is these larger troop deployments have never eventuated. The estimated number of North Korean troops in Russia remains between 14,000 (Opens in new window) and 16,000 (Opens in new window) – higher than the 12,000 from the initial deployment in October 2024, but a discrepancy (Opens in new window) explained by different methods of estimation among Ukrainian, South Korea, and Western intelligence agencies. North Korea has largely stopped sending more troops since late 2024. The South Korean military doesn’t detect (Opens in new window) any signs of future deployment.
North Korea’s pause is worth noting. It was North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un’s idea (Opens in new window) to send troops to Russia to repel Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk. As the war drags on, Russia needs personnel and is expanding (Opens in new window) recruitment to Africa. Moscow could have asked North Korea to dispatch more troops to defend the Russian frontline – but there is no sign of that occurring.
Sending labourers, by contrast, earns the regime hard currency without putting them in harm’s way.
Of the North Korean soldiers still stationed in Russia, 9,500 (Opens in new window) are deployed as active duty and are engaged (Opens in new window) with firing barrel artillery and multiple launch rocket systems against Ukrainian forces along the Russia–Ukraine border in the Kursk region. These soldiers are (Opens in new window) also conducting reconnaissance and attack drone operations. Pyongyang has also sent labourers to assemble drones in weapons factories (Opens in new window) and to rebuild (Opens in new window) war-torn Kursk. Each North Korean labourer in Russia is believed to earn (Opens in new window) US$7,500 per year, much less than the US$24,000 that a soldier makes (Opens in new window) for the state.
There have not been any breakthroughs on the diplomatic front to justify the pause in North Korean troop deployments. North Korea continues to reject dialogue with the United States and South Korea, while Russia keeps (Opens in new window) shelling Ukrainian cities. The Russia–North Korea arms trade valued at US$14.4 billion remains (Opens in new window) robust (Opens in new window), which suggests there has been no alliance quarrel. China has not criticised (Opens in new window) North Korean troop deployment to Russia and is keen to expand economic cooperation with Pyongyang.
Instead, the pause in North Korean deployments seems to be due to the changing nature of the Russia–Ukraine war. Ukraine’s counteroffensive now centres on (Opens in new window) recapturing (Opens in new window) Russia-held territory in the Donetsk Oblast instead of occupying (Opens in new window) Russian ground. It has not launched any attacks on Russian territory since withdrawing (Opens in new window) from Kursk in March 2025. North Korea doesn’t allow (Opens in new window) its soldiers to fight on Ukrainian soil because the scope of its alliance treaty with Russia doesn’t cover Ukraine, including land under Russian de facto control. Ukraine and Russia have also shifted to using (Opens in new window) long-range missiles and drones to attack targets deep behind the frontline. North Korean troops have (Opens in new window) little air defence capability to offer Russia.
The pause also sheds light on what happened on the North Korean homefront. The domestic audience, even in a highly controlled state, must still be considered. When North Korea first dispatched troops in October 2024, it neither confirmed (Opens in new window) nor denied the move. North Korea kept (Opens in new window) its deployment a secret, issuing (Opens in new window) death certificates for soldiers killed in Russia as having died “in training”. Pyongyang only admitted to casualties in April 2025 after news had spread (Opens in new window) throughout the country and Ukraine had withdrawn from Kursk. The recent capture and handover (Opens in new window) of two North Korean soldiers by Ukraine to South Korea was also an indication of defection risks if North Korea sent too many new recruits at once. Deploying additional troops to Russia without the ability to reintegrate (Opens in new window) them back to society can undermine the government’s control on outside information. Poor treatment (Opens in new window) of veterans or killed soldiers’ families can be equally dangerous.
North Korea doesn’t need to send additional troops to have achieved the main objectives with Russia. Its soldiers have gained (Opens in new window) real combat experience and can teach those skills in military academies at home. Pyongyang has demonstrated the efficiency (Opens in new window) of its weapons on the Russian battlefield to prospective buyers. And it has also fulfilled its end of the alliance contract by defending Kursk, which Moscow repays by sharing (Opens in new window) sensitive military technology.
Sending labourers, by contrast, earns the regime hard currency without putting them in harm’s way. These labourers also provide North Korea with first-hand expertise (Opens in new window) if it wants to modernise the domestic military industry.
It seems likely North Korea will rely on the 9,500 active soldiers still on Russian soil to meet its defence obligations. Don’t expect that number to go up anytime soon.
About the author
Khang Vu
Khang Vu is a visiting researcher in the Political Science Department at Boston College.
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