The Australia–India–Japan Supply Chain Resilience Initiative recognised (Opens in new window) this reality early. Launched in 2021 amid pandemic disruptions and growing concerns about concentrated supply chains, it struggled to attract sustained political attention.
The same shift is visible in defence.
Australia and India have spent much of the last decade building practical habits of cooperation through exercises, logistics arrangements and operational engagement. Japan, meanwhile, has steadily expanded its security partnerships and become more comfortable discussing defence-industrial collaboration.
What is emerging is a recognition that maritime security, industrial capability and technological resilience now reinforce one another.
Over the past year, disruptions to global shipping routes, instability in West Asia, concerns about undersea infrastructure and intensifying maritime competition have reinforced how dependent Indo-Pacific prosperity remains on secure commons. At the same time, advances in satellite technologies, information-sharing and maritime domain awareness have created new opportunities for collaboration.
Seen in this context, Modi’s stop in Indonesia is especially noteworthy. The routes connecting Japanese industry, Australian resources and India's economic future run through the same Southeast Asian chokepoints. Keeping those waterways open, stable and secure is no longer simply a maritime concern; it is a prerequisite for economic resilience.
None of this means India, Australia and Japan will see every issue in the same way. India’s commitment to strategic autonomy remains fundamental to its foreign policy. Australia’s alliance with the United States remains central to its security outlook. Japan’s calculations are shaped by its own alliances, geography and threat perceptions. Yet each of these actors must confront the reality of a changing Indo-Pacific where the US is no longer taking on the onus of organising and coordinating cooperation. On the contrary, calls for burden sharing are growing as the US recalibrates its own strategic priorities.
But that is precisely what makes the conversation worth having.
The value of a trilateral framework is not that it brings together three identical countries. It is that it brings together three complementary ones. Japan contributes technology, capital and a sophisticated approach to economic security. Australia contributes resources, maritime reach and a growing defence role. India brings scale, geography and an ever more expansive maritime outlook.
For much of the last decade, the task facing Canberra, New Delhi and Tokyo was to build trust. That task is largely complete. The challenge now is translating shared interests into shared capability.
If there is a larger significance to Modi’s visit, it lies there. The region’s future will depend on the ability to connect maritime security, industrial capability and supply-chain resilience into a coherent response. The strategic logic for that conversation already exists if India, Australia and Japan are prepared to give it a more durable form.