AUKUS, explained.

The Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS New Jersey (Justin E. Yarborough/DVIDS)
AUKUS inquiry scepticism runs only one way
The AUKUS Public Inquiry doubts Washington’s motives at length – and barely questions Beijing’s.
AUKUS, explained.

The Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS New Jersey (Justin E. Yarborough/DVIDS)
The AUKUS Public Inquiry doubts Washington’s motives at length – and barely questions Beijing’s.
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“Premised as it is on assertions that China is a strategic threat to Australia, AUKUS increases the likelihood of Australia becoming involved in war with China – the worst possible outcome for our nation’s future.”
So reads one finding of a report (Opens in new window) issued this month by the AUKUS Public Inquiry, an initiative of the Australian Peace and Security Forum and supported by trade unions and community groups.
One of the strengths of this report is that lays bare the refusal by successive Australian governments to detail these “assertions” about the threat from China.
The principal weakness of the report is that it also neglects to do so.
AUKUS was created in 2021 on the basis that Australia needed nuclear-powered submarines to reinforce American power in the region. The Morrison government and its advisers calculated that, without such power, Australia and every other nation in Asia would be at Beijing’s mercy. They would have to come to an accommodation with an ascendant China, the region’s new hegemon. In other words, if the US was not in charge in Asia, China would be, effectively forcing Australia to sue for peace on terms favourable to Beijing.
This presumption, the core logic that inspired AUKUS, is barely touched upon in the AUKUS Public Inquiry report. When the report does briefly acknowledge the problem of growing Chinese power, it is quickly waved away:
China is now a global superpower and the leading power in the Asian region. China's level of activity in the South China Sea and the expansion of its sphere of influence in southeast Asia and the Pacific introduces a challenging dimension to the Australia-China relationship. China is also our largest trading partner and central to our future prosperity. AUKUS directly threatens this coexistence by contributing to the attempted containment of China. It is clear the AUKUS decision was based on unsubstantiated threats from China and to accord with the US policy to contain and contest China.
The report is studded with quotes from inquiry submissions downplaying China’s military threat to Australia. An exception is made for the possibility that China might strike American bases on Australian soil, but without those bases, it is argued, China has no quarrel with Australia and is vanishingly unlikely to attack it.
I have myself warned (Opens in new window) that the new US “rotational” presence – military bases in all but name – will make Australia a potential Chinese target, and I agree that this risk exceeds the security benefits Australia gets from the bases. But it also needs to be acknowledged that, even absent these facilities, Australia will still be at risk from China’s military.
Even absent American power, China is not fated to automatically become the region’s hegemon.
The report is quite right about China’s regional ambitions but fails to acknowledge that they won’t magically go away if Australia cancels AUKUS or if US forces leave Australia and the region. The deeply concerning scale and sophistication of China’s ongoing military modernisation (Opens in new window) barely registers in the report.
If Beijing becomes utterly dominant in our region, it won’t have to invade. Australian compliance with China’s needs and ambitions will be achieved without the costly and dangerous business of actually using military force. That coercive power, which only comes from unchallenged strategic dominance, is the true threat, and it is the fear that inspired AUKUS: without American power, it was argued, there is only Chinese power.
Effective opposition to AUKUS should begin with a simple declaration that this dichotomy is false. It is false firstly because, even absent American power, China is not fated to automatically become the region’s hegemon. Australia and its partners get a say in this. They are not helpless. They have agency. One of the ways Australia can exercise that agency is by building a defence force so lethal and effective that China will never have the means to coerce it. AUKUS makes it harder to achieve that goal because it so expensive, slow and uncertain to produce results.
But the dichotomy is false also because AUKUS won’t help to cement American power in Asia. For Washington, AUKUS is simply a highly favourable arms deal. It does nothing to obligate the US to defend its regional position – one that has been weakening for more than a generation because it is unwilling to risk war with China.
As I said in my ABC Boyer Lecture (Opens in new window), Australian statecraft must now be built on dual scepticism: one superpower is in decline as a regional force while the other is on the rise, and Canberra should be wary of the motives of both. The weakness of the AUKUS Public Inquiry report is that it directs almost all its scepticism towards the United States and reserves little for China.
About the author
Sam Roggeveen
Sam Roggeveen is Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. He is the author of The Echidna Strategy: Australia's Search for Power and Peace (Opens in new window), and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Canberra.
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