Syria, explained.
The inherent weakness of the Syrian regime is part of the story, but also the resilience, patience, and pragmatism of HTS (Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images)
The rebel offensive needed a safe base from which to operate – and bitter experience tells of the wider dangers involved.
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Beyond Assad: Jihadist strongholds and the threat to the WestBeyond Assad: Jihadist strongholds and the threat to the West
The fall of Bashar al-Assad was years in the making and seemingly over in moments. Breaking what had been a dormant chapter in the Syrian civil war, on 27 November the rebel fighters Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched an offensive that in a matter of days swept into Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo. Within a week, a series of unexpected rebel advances ultimately resulted in the fall of Damascus and saw Assad flee to Moscow.
While HTS is one of the many actors involved in the anti-Assad movement, it has primarily led the charge and is an organisation with a unique history. Emerging as then Syrian branch of the Islamic State’s predecessor in 2012, what was then known as Jahbat al-Nusra would eventually disavow ISIS and pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda. However, in another surprise move, Jahbat al-Nusra broke with al-Qaeda for the ostensible reasons of focusing on the local Syrian conflict rather than global jihad, establishing as HTS in 2017. Since then, the group has been able to insert itself into the local fabric, making itself an indispensable governing body by establishing the civilian and technocratic “Syrian Salvation Government” and its local municipalities in the Idlib province.
A common refrain around the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is that Russian distraction in Ukraine and injuries sustained by the so-called “Axis of Resistance” backed by Iran in the conflicts since the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas provided the opportunity for this latest offensive. Alongside the inherent weakness of the Syrian regime, this is no doubt part of the story.
However, the resilience, patience, and pragmatism of HTS should not be discounted. In particular, establishing a stable base of operation allowed the movement to professionalise and expand. Such a capability has proven crucial to the success of several externally orientated violent campaigns undertaken by jihadist actors. For example, the spate of violence against Europe by ISIS in the mid-2010s was facilitated and supported from its so-called Caliphate. Likewise, al-Qaeda was able to plan and execute the 9/11 attacks from its bases in Afghanistan.
Jihadist actors have demonstrated a continued desire to conduct attacks against Western targets, an impetus bolstered by stable or semi-stable bases of operations in countries such as Syria.
Given these experiences, the continuation of jihadist safe bases or pockets of jihadist de facto control is a worrying trend – especially considering militant jihadist movements still retain the desire and capability to inspire and conduct attacks against Western targets.
Syria has already proven fertile ground for a potential emergence of ISIS, which is currently experiencing an operational surge. US Central Command recently claimed that “from January to June 2024, ISIS has claimed 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria,” a figure on track to double the number of attacks claimed in 2023. Other reports indicate this number is if anything an underestimate, given ISIS has in recent years deliberately under-reported its attack as part of a strategy to re-establish itself under the radar. In the wake of Assad’s fall, the United States said it had carried out a series of strikes against ISIS targets in Syria.
ISIS is still far from its heyday, where the movement controlled a territory the size of Great Britain. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that ISIS will be able to exploit the chaos that will ensue in a post-Assad Syria. Of particular concern is the some 50,000 ISIS detainees in Syria that can serve to revitalise the group and should they successfully be freed, as ISIS has attempted previously. Any momentum can be impactful given the movement’s history, and continued desire to engage in Western-orientated attacks plots. And it was the regional affiliate of ISIS in Afghanistan, IS-K, that carried out the deadliest attack outside of the Middle East and North Africa region in recent memory, killing 155 people in an attack against a concert hall in Moscow.
This also underscores that Syria is not the only concern. Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, al-Qaeda has used its historic relationship with the Taliban to once again establish itself in Afghanistan. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reports that there are an estimated 400 al-Qaeda members are currently in Afghanistan. An unpublished report further notes the undocumented gold mining currently being undertaken by the Taliban, and al Qaeda’s share of this activity has reportedly totalled $194.4 million since 2022. The presence of a sympathetic government in Afghanistan, has and will continue to, provide al-Qaeda with operational space to coordinate and support its global activities. Similarly, the success of al-Qaeda aligned organisations in Africa forms part of the tapestry of widening operational breathing room. The al-Qaeda linked, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, has over the last decade firmly established itself in the Sahel region, challenging state authority in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
These developments should be seen in the context of al-Qaeda’s continued desire to support and motivate violence against Western targets. Recent al-Qaeda linked publications such as The Wolves of Manhattan and O Mujahideen in the West, seek to radicalise Western youths and have explicitly called for attacks against Western countries. These publications continue the legacy established by al-Qaeda’s previous publication, Inspire, which sought to motivate a younger western audience by providing technical support and target lists to potential jihadistsin easily digestible articles. Although the influencing impact of these instructional magazines alone should not be overstated, they nevertheless work as part of a wider motivating milieu that move would-be jihadist from rhetoric into action.
In all, jihadist actors have demonstrated a continued desire to conduct attacks against Western targets, an impetus bolstered by stable or semi-stable bases of operations in countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Africa.
About the author
James Paterson
Dr James Paterson is the Research Associate for the Transnational Challenges Program at the Lowy Institute.
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