ASEAN, explained.
Syrians celebrate in Damascus after the overthrow of the Assad regime on 27 December 2024 (Emin Sansar/Anadolu via Getty Images)
The quiet diplomacy model practised by the Southeast Asian grouping complements efforts by other powers and offers much to gain.
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The role for ASEAN in Syria’s restorationThe role for ASEAN in Syria’s restoration
In December 2024, The Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad collapsed, creating shockwaves few anticipated. An unstable Syria threatens global energy markets, refugee flows into Asia, and the spread of extremist networks – but the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, despite its longstanding cultural and economic ties to the Middle East, has largely remained on the sidelines.
UN agencies estimate that rebuilding Syria could cost more than US$400 billion, a market tailor-made for ASEAN’s strengths in energy governance, agribusiness, digital infrastructure, and low-key diplomacy. If ASEAN does not seize this moment, it will cede ground to Russia, China, Turkey, and Gulf states – squandering a chance to transform itself from a regional player into a genuine global actor.
Syria’s economy lies in ruins. Its GDP fell from $61 billion in 2010 to under $29 billion by late 2024, with total wartime losses topping $226 billion. Roughly 90 per cent of Syrians live below the poverty line, and unemployment stands at about 25 per cent. President Ahmad al-Sharāʿa’s caretaker government, installed after the February 2025 National Dialogue Conference, is charged with drafting a new constitution and planning elections – but operates amid competing militias, foreign proxies, and a fractured security sector. Without a robust external catalyst, there is a very real danger of localised violence flaring anew, with consequences that extend far beyond Damascus.
Assuming Western and Gulf-led initiatives alone will stabilise Syria is both naïve and perilous.
The stakes for Southeast Asia are immediate. Syria’s oil pipelines once linked Gulf hydrocarbons to European markets and renewed instability could send crude prices spiking, exacerbating inflationary pressures in energy-importing ASEAN economies. Refugees fleeing through Jordan, Lebanon, and Türkiye would turn to secondary routes – by boat – to Malaysia and Indonesia, stretching already limited asylum-processing capacities. Extremist groups finding haven in ungoverned Syrian territories could export ideology and fighters to restive areas in Mindanao, Aceh, and southern Thailand.
Assuming Western and Gulf-led initiatives alone will stabilise Syria is both naïve and perilous.
On energy governance, ASEAN’s track record speaks volumes. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore account for roughly 70 per cent of the bloc’s GDP. Malaysia’s Petronas and Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds (Temasek, GIC) have built reputations for transparent revenue management, petroleum-sector regulation, and state-owned enterprise reform. Syria’s oil output has collapsed from 383,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2010 to roughly 90,000 bpd by 2023. Dispatching technical missions from Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to advise Damascus on hydrocarbon law revisions and investment frameworks could help Syria avoid the resource-curse pitfalls that crippled Venezuela and Iran. In return, ASEAN firms stand to secure lucrative contracts for pipelines, refineries, and service contracts, while Southeast Asian consumers benefit from more stable energy prices.
Syria’s economy lies in ruins (Mahmoud Sulaiman/Unsplash)
Agricultural rehabilitation offers another clear win. Before the conflict, Syria was the Levant’s granary; today, its irrigation canals are destroyed and farmland lies abandoned. ASEAN’s experience – halving rural poverty in Indonesia and Thailand between 1999 and 2020 through integrated rice policies, and operating the ASEAN Rice Reserve to shield markets from shocks – provides a ready blueprint. An “ASEAN–OIC Syrian Resilience Fund,” seeded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Gulf partners, could finance drip-irrigation systems, repair pumps along the Euphrates, and establish agro-processing facilities to add value before export. Immediate employment for returning refugees and displaced farmers would stabilise food prices and reduce Syria’s dependence on expensive imports – a key factor in social stability.
Reinvigorating Syria’s human capital must run in parallel. Pre-war literacy rates topped 90 per cent, with universities in Damascus and Aleppo formerly ranked among the Middle East’s best. ASEAN’s premier institutions could form a branch-campus consortium in Damascus and Aleppo. Scholarships prioritising women and minority groups – aligned with the National Dialogue’s inclusivity mandate – would develop a new generation of engineers, doctors, and policy experts. Exchange programs sending Syrians to Singapore’s Duke–NUS Medical School or UPM’s agricultural research center would seed a diaspora network committed to returning with skills essential for reconstruction.
Syria’s transition is more than a humanitarian imperative – it is a test of ASEAN’s aspiration to be a global actor.
Yet reconstruction is more than megaprojects; it demands genuine reconciliation. ASEAN’s “quiet diplomacy” has delivered results, from brokering the 2005 Aceh peace agreement to coordinating humanitarian assistance during the Rohingya crisis. Pairing Indonesian and Malaysian NGOs with emerging Syrian civil-society groups can fast-track transitional justice, local truth commissions, and community reconciliation.
Of course, ASEAN must navigate a minefield of great-power rivalries: Russia maintains military bases and oil interests in Syria, China seeks Belt and Road access, the United States demands counter-terrorism cooperation, Turkey holds northern Syrian territory, and Gulf states fund reconstruction. ASEAN should hedge by engaging all parties, staying neutral, and ensuring transparency, so its quiet diplomacy complements other powers and avoids zero-sum conflicts.
Time is short. Before the end of this year, ASEAN must appoint a Special Envoy to Syria, secure observer status in the ARF and ADMM-Plus, launch an ASEAN–OIC–ADB Reconstruction Facility, and mobilise its private sector around Special Economic Zones. Otherwise, ASEAN will risk ceding influence to external actors misaligned with Southeast Asian interests. Leveraging Singapore’s, Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s leadership as rotating chairs can fast-track consensus among member states and secure the necessary budgetary commitments.
Syria’s transition is more than a humanitarian imperative – it is a test of ASEAN’s aspiration to be a global actor. Thought leaders and policy analysts must act now to ensure Southeast Asia helps turn Syria’s rubble into a bridge between East and West. Otherwise, ASEAN will be sidelined in shaping a future that directly impacts its security and prosperity.
About the author
Kurniawan Arif Maspul
Kurniawan Arif Maspul is a researcher and interdisciplinary writer focusing on Islamic diplomacy and Southeast Asian political thought.
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