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Visitors pass by the beer exhibition area at the 2023 RCEP Regional Food Industry Expo in Yantai, China (Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
The 2027 General Review is best chance for the world’s largest trading bloc to become an anchor against geoeconomic fragmentation.
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RCEP’s moment to matterRCEP’s moment to matter
All the handshakes at the Xi–Trump summit in Beijing this month could not hide the uncomfortable reality that rivalry between the world’s two largest economies shows no sign of abating. For the Asia-Pacific, this creates a pressing dilemma as the region becomes the central battleground of intensifying geoeconomic competition.
The most effective insurance against these fragmentary pressures is deeper regional integration – and a powerful tool at hand is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The deal, which entered into force in 2022 and includes the ASEAN members as well as Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, is the world’s largest trading bloc.
Yet in the four years since, RCEP has yet to achieve its potential. The agreement remains under-utilised.
This makes the upcoming RCEP General Review in 2027 more than an administrative milestone. It offers a chance to transform the agreement into a far more powerful engine of regional integration and resilience. At the 5th RCEP Summit in October 2025, leaders stressed the “pivotal role of RCEP in contributing to regional economic integration and cooperation”. The question is whether RCEP members can translate that commitment into concrete action.
RCEP’s greatest value lies far beyond tariff reduction, but in its role as a collaborative platform for regional economic governance. By providing a stable and reliable forum for dialogue and cooperation – increasingly prized as countries manage a period of profound global uncertainty – RCEP can serve as a stabilising force for the region.
A strengthened RCEP would diversify regional supply chains, reduce vulnerability to unilateral trade measures, and amplify a collective voice that neither Washington nor Beijing can afford to ignore.
RCEP builds upon a dense network of regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with overlapping memberships. By acting as a unifying framework for the region’s “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs, RCEP can provide a predictable institutional environment that fosters trust among members.
Greater emphasis on complementarity between RCEP and these FTAs – especially through harmonised rules, standards, and processes – would sharpen RCEP’s value for businesses operating in the region. Institutional stability and regulatory coherence would, in turn, strengthen the region’s economic resilience.
The 2027 General Review cannot afford to become a talk shop. A phased approach to the General Review, focused on early harvest gains, offers the most credible path forward.
By identifying where alignment is already within reach, RCEP can deliver tangible value for members and build momentum for more ambitious upgrades. Recent upgrades to regional agreements offer useful benchmarks – newly adopted provisions that can be more readily incorporated into RCEP.
Durians at an orchard in Chumphon, Thailand, with exports of the fruit to China reported to have benefited from RCEP (Wang Teng/Xinhua via Getty Images)
Three areas are especially ripe for progress.
First, RCEP should upgrade its e-commerce chapter into a comprehensive digital economy chapter. This could start with baseline principles on data governance, including data protection and cross-border data transfers.
With two-thirds of RCEP members among the 66 countries that recently agreed to the WTO e-commerce agreement – despite the consensus the model preventing it from coming into force – the region has demonstrated leadership on digital trade. RCEP should both reflect and reinforce this.
Second, RCEP should strengthen the architecture that underpins regional supply chains. This involves improving customs interoperability and tackling behind-the-border barriers. Enhanced information-sharing among members will also bolster supply chain resilience.
Recent agreements offer useful precedents. The Singapore–New Zealand Agreement on Trade in Essential Supplies, for instance, commits both countries not to impose export restrictions in times of supply chain disruption.
Third, RCEP should respond to the growing urgency of environmental sustainability. Expanding commitments on environmental cooperation and protection – with a view to eventually establishing a dedicated environmental chapter with an environmental goods list – would align RCEP with the evolving frontier of trade governance.
The vision for the ASEAN Power Grid, which aims to interconnect the electricity infrastructure of all the member states, reflects the appetite and demand for reliable energy supply. This demand could not be more urgent after recent oil shocks resulting from conflict with Iran.
Keeping pace with regional initiatives is essential if RCEP aspires to be the preferred framework for regional trade and investment flows.
A successful General Review demands commitment from members and robust institutional capacity. Members must honour their shared commitment to RCEP – it is an investment in the region’s future that pays returns only if they show up.
The runway to 2027 is short. A strengthened RCEP would diversify regional supply chains, reduce vulnerability to unilateral trade measures, and amplify a collective voice that neither Washington nor Beijing can afford to ignore. As geoeconomic competition intensifies, the region faces a defining choice: be a passive arena for competing interests or strengthen its resilience through deeper regional integration. RCEP offers the architecture for the latter.
About the author
Jesslene Lee
Jesslene Lee is a researcher at the Asia Competitiveness Institute, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.
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