Bluey and Bingo spotted in Paris ahead of the L’Atelier de Noël de Bluey activation at Fou de Pâtisserie from 29 November-9 December (Pierre Suu/Getty Images)
Bluey is a triumph, but not a soft-power strategy
Japan, Korea and China treat cartoons as a tool of influence rather than mere entertainment.
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|Bluey is a triumph, but not a soft-power strategy
Bluey is a triumph, but not a soft-power strategy
In September, a panel at the University of Sydney Business School on AI and the creative industries closed on an unexpected hero: Bluey. The series, produced by Brisbane’s Ludo Studio with ABC and BBC Studios, logged 45.2 billion minutes on US streaming in 2025 (Opens in new window), according to Nielsen, and panellists pointed to its unapologetically local voice – Queensland backyards and Australian slang included – as a creative and commercial asset.
Having worked across Japan and China for the past decade, I find it striking that Australia does not treat Bluey as what it is: an extraordinary instrument of soft power. And this at a time when its largest Asian neighbours compete fiercely, through their own animated characters and worlds, for the imagination of millions of young people.
Japan’s trajectory as the mecca of anime offers the classic blueprint. For decades, Tokyo nurtured an “organic” soft power that worked through emotional attraction and an apparent depoliticisation of its content – what philosopher Simon May describes as “the power of cute” – call it “Kawaii Power”. According to the Association of Japanese Animations (AJA) (Opens in new window), the global anime market reached a record ¥3.84 trillion (US$25.25 billion) in 2024, with 56% of revenue – ¥2.17 trillion – now generated overseas.
What Australia lacks is not talent but a policy.
This is a striking paradox for anyone familiar with how perceptions of anime, manga and pop culture have evolved: while government attempts to institutionalise this appeal through “Cool Japan” and the New Cool Japan Strategy (Opens in new window)often sink under bureaucracy and structural labour shortages, the medium itself, and the fandom behind it, has made Japanese aesthetics a universal visual language. The adoption of One Piece’s pirate flag in protests from Nepal to Latin America (Opens in new window)is living proof.
Meanwhile, both South Korea and China have shed their historic roles as low-cost subcontracting hubs for foreign studios, though they have taken radically different routes to creative autonomy.
South Korea integrated animation and digital comics (webtoons) into its broader Hallyu (Korean Wave) ecosystem, pairing strategic state backing with international streaming platforms and transmedia hits – epitomised by global phenomena like Netflix’s K-Pop Demon Hunters (2025) – to build export-driven soft power.
Beijing, by contrast, has engineered a state-backed transformation towards self-reliance. China’s animation sector (donghua) has rapidly shifted from waiba (foreign outsourcing) to guochuang (national creation), pursuing narrative sovereignty on a monumental scale. The release of Ne Zha 2 in 2025 proved that the rules of global media have changed. Grossing more than US$2 billion worldwide (Opens in new window)to become the highest-grossing animated film in history, the film earned US$1.95 billion – a staggering 97.5% of its box office – inside China. Unlike Seoul’s outward-looking model, Beijing no longer needs Western audiences or Hollywood distribution to finance and validate blockbuster animation. Its domestic market alone can sustain high-end technological production while projecting distinct cultural mythologies.
Now, generative artificial intelligence is upending these models. By drastically lowering production costs and separating the anime aesthetic from its traditional artisanal origins, generative AI allows anyone – including state actors – to produce persuasive, high-end animated content at scale without an identifiable human author, turning entertainment technology into a tool for shaping public perception.
The Bluey heads down Central Park West during the Thanksgiving Day Parade in New York, 2023 (Photo: Gordon Donovan/Getty Images)
What Australia lacks is not talent but a policy. Japan and China both treat animation, comics and games (what the region calls ACG) as a strategic industry. Australia, with funding split across federal and state agencies, has no equivalent.
To turn isolated hits into a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy, here are three modest steps:
Negotiate an audiovisual co-production treaty with Japan. Screen Australia (Opens in new window)currently administers bilateral co-production treaties with 12 countries – including China and South Korea – alongside memorandums of understanding with France and New Zealand, yet none exists with Japan. Such an agreement, tailored explicitly to animation and ACG, would unlock joint financing and intellectual-property sharing with Asia’s premier creative powerhouse.
Integrate animation and ACG into DFAT’s cultural diplomacy. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, working alongside Creative Australia, should elevate animation from children’s entertainment to a core pillar of regional soft power and digital trade.
Establish youth media-literacy programs on synthetic content. As AI-generated animation becomes a vehicle for unattributed influence campaigns, equipping young Australians to assess synthetic media critically is a matter of cognitive resilience.
There is a model to borrow. The EU has begun building direct industry dialogue with Japan: in 2025 it brought European and Japanese producers together at a business workshop in Osaka (Opens in new window). Australia could go further: a small taskforce to engage the EU, Japan and China on animation, an industry where universal storytelling and technological innovation meet.
Javier Fernández is an Adjunct Researcher at the Waseda Institute of Latin American Studies (WILAS) and Head of Culture at the Instituto Cervantes in Tokyo.