Aid & development, explained.
Australia’s region is largely peaceful, but it is not free from conflict (Skye Out/DFAT)
Understanding local drivers of violence can make aid more effective, but resurrecting the capability will take time.
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Bringing back conflict prevention as a priority in Australia’s aid programBringing back conflict prevention as a priority in Australia’s aid program
Conflict prevention appears poised to re-emerge as a priority in the aid program. The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade recently accepted submissions on the role of the Australian development program in conflict prevention. This follows the establishment of a branch on conflict prevention established in 2025 (although focused entirely on interstate conflict). Moreover, the OECD’s peer review of the Australian aid program noted weak expertise and architecture in relation to conflict and fragility.
There is a strong case for the reengagement of the aid program with issues of conflict. Australia’s region is largely peaceful, but it is not free from conflict. Regional fragmentation in Papua New Guinea, ongoing fighting in Myanmar and Southern Thailand, civil unrest in New Caledonia and the persistent risk posed by the conflict-climate nexus in the Pacific as the climate crisis worsens, are live sites of potential conflict that require attention.
With shifts in the global balance of power, the potential for broader global conflicts to affect the region increases.
The UN Pathways to Peace Report estimates that for every US$1 spent on conflict prevention, up to US$16 is saved in conflict response and reconstruction. And being a proactive development partner on conflict prevention keeps Australia as a trusted and valued first choice partner in the region.
The aid program offers a mechanism for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to take account of intrastate conflict (alongside interstate) and to recognise the value of development programming in addressing conflict drivers. Local drivers of conflict in Asia and the Pacific, such as inequality and grievances related to poverty, competition over resources and a breakdown of social safety nets, livelihoods and service delivery, have been behind some of the most prominent and persistent conflicts. These drivers have manifested as land disputes in Solomon Islands, in localised incidents of violence in Bougainville, and as ongoing separatist conflict driven by human rights violations in West Papua in Indonesia.
Existing aid investments already address issues of exclusion and marginalisation, service delivery and social cohesion.
Preventing intrastate conflict requires a primary focus on addressing these local drivers, and the ways in which they may be instrumentalised by international actors. Where the aid program is focused on delivering public goods that aim to strengthen the social contract and ensure resilience, the aid program is arguably already playing an under-acknowledged conflict prevention role.
A conflict prevention lens for the aid program will not be appropriate everywhere. DFAT will have to make strategic choices about how to allocate these resources. They are likely best directed towards Melanesia, where Australia is also the largest development partner.
Existing aid investments already address issues of exclusion and marginalisation, service delivery and social cohesion. These investments could deliver a stronger conflict prevention dividend by integrating a conflict sensitivity lens. This approach would ensure that the links between service delivery and conflict prevention are intentionally targeted. While such programs would remain focused principally on delivering on sector priorities, conflict prevention could be mainstreamed.
Alongside integration of a conflict sensitivity lens, there may be instances where standalone conflict prevention programming is appropriate. This may be the case, for instance, in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville as it moves towards independence. Such programs would need to be sensitively designed, taking account of the need for high levels of flexibility, devolved decision making and working through local actors with the legitimacy to lead.
In other regions where Australia has a smaller footprint, but where risks of conflict remain real, conflict prevention work is likely best pursued through multilateral or regional institutions.
Making judgements about this mix of options will require nuance and conflict expertise that DFAT lost when the Conflict and Fragility Branch was disbanded in 2020. Some of that expertise remains within the Department but is scattered across teams. Some was lost entirely.
It will also require improved coordination across Australia’s whole of government conflict prevention approach. There is significant room for more joint analysis, strategy and (where appropriate) delivery. Similarly, architecture aimed at supporting coordination, such as the DFAT-AFP liaison role that used to sit within DFAT’s Law and Justice Division, will be important to make commitments meaningful in practice, not just on paper.
The aid program already delivers an under-acknowledged conflict prevention dividend. Recognising this more explicitly would be valuable and can, in appropriate instances, be strengthened. But doing so sensibly requires careful choices. And it means rebuilding conflict expertise, which will take years, not budget cycles. If conflict prevention is to become more than a slogan in Australia’s development policy, it will require sustained institutional investment and a willingness to make hard choices about priorities.
About the authors
Lisa Denney
Lisa Denney is Director of the Centre for Human Security and Social Change at La Trobe University.
Thushara Dibley
Thushara Dibley is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Human Security and Social Change with over 15 years’ experience in research and evaluation across Indonesia, Timor-Leste and Australia.
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