India, explained.
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (L) and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio meet at the State Department in Washington, DC, in July 2025 (Allison Robbert/AFP via Getty Images)
If Washington and New Delhi can compartmentalise their disagreements, the Quad becomes more predictable.
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Can the Quad regain momentum after the India–US reset?Can the Quad regain momentum after the India–US reset?
In 2025, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) – a strategic partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States – appeared to be losing momentum. Trade tensions between Washington and New Delhi escalated into punitive tariffs, visa fees increased, and pointed rhetoric strained trust. The postponement of the leaders’ summit reinforced doubts about whether the grouping could withstand serious bilateral shocks, particularly between its two most consequential members. For critics, this seemed to confirm the Quad risked becoming broader in agenda, thinner in cohesion, and increasingly dependent on atmospherics rather than durable alignment.
At the centre of that turbulence was India-US relations. Japan and Australia remain formal US allies, providing continuity and institutional predictability. India’s role is different. Its geography anchors the Indian Ocean; its strategic autonomy gives the Quad political weight beyond alliance structures. But that autonomy also introduces friction. When Washington and New Delhi align, the Quad expands in confidence and scope. When they diverge, the grouping narrows.
The February 2026 trade deal between the United States and India therefore carries significance beyond tariff adjustments. Washington rolled back additional duties and eased reciprocal measures, while New Delhi signalled steps to rebalance trade and diversify energy flows. More important than the headline figures was the political choice to de-escalate. After a year of economic coercion and public frustration, both governments opted to stabilise the relationship.
US Assistant Secretary of South and Central Asian Affairs S. Paul Kapur recently described the Quad as “an important part of US policy in the Indo-Pacific”. He linked the improved trade atmosphere directly to wider cooperation with India and other partners on defence and regional priorities. The formulation was deliberate: the trade reset was presented not as a transactional compromise, but as enabling strategic coordination.
This matters because there is much scepticism surrounding the Quad’s structural fragility. As the grouping expanded from maritime security into supply chains, critical technologies, health, infrastructure and climate initiatives, critics argued that ambition was outpacing institutional capacity. The more diffuse the agenda became, the more it depended on sustained political alignment among its members.
The delay of the leaders’ summit and visible India-US friction seemed to validate those concerns. Uncertainty surrounding US foreign assistance budgets and domestic political shifts also raised questions about durability. If American development funding tightens or climate priorities fluctuate with electoral cycles, the softer pillars of the Quad risk volatility and contraction.
For now, the February reset offers the Quad something it lacked in 2025: room to manoeuvre.
The February reset does not eliminate those vulnerabilities. What it does restore is the political foundation without which none of the Quad’s agendas, hard or soft, can function. During the 2025 trade dispute, defence cooperation between India and the United States proved more resilient than expected. The ten-year defence cooperation framework continued to advance. Discussions on co-production, including jet engines and advanced systems, remained active. Military exercises and interoperability initiatives did not collapse. This continuity suggests that the security pillar of the relationship has developed insulation from economic disputes – a structural shift compared with earlier decades.
From Canberra’s and Tokyo’s perspectives, that distinction is significant. If India-US disagreements can be compartmentalised without paralysing multilateral coordination, the Quad becomes more predictable. Diplomatic signalling now points towards reconvening the leaders’ summit in 2026, with renewed emphasis on maritime domain awareness, supply chain resilience and critical technology standards, areas where delivery is measurable and strategically salient.
Still, trade asymmetries persist. India’s strategic autonomy remains central to its foreign policy identity, particularly in relation to energy and Russia. Domestic politics in both countries can quickly reintroduce economic friction. The key question, then, is not whether the February trade deal guarantees Quad revival. It does not. Rather, it restores strategic headroom. By choosing de-escalation, Washington and New Delhi signalled recognition that economic coercion among partners undermines shared objectives in a contested Indo-Pacific. Kapur’s characterisation of the Quad as “very important” reflects an assessment that multilateral coordination amplifies national strategy, but only if bilateral trust holds.
Whether this marks a durable second wind or a temporary reprieve will depend on implementation. If restored India–US alignment translates into tangible progress on maritime security, technology standards and regional capacity-building, and if climate and development commitments prove resilient despite domestic pressures, the narrative of shrinkage will fade. If not, scepticism will harden.
For now, the February reset offers the Quad something it lacked in 2025: room to manoeuvre. Whether that becomes a durable second wind or merely a temporary reprieve will depend on whether alignment between its two pivotal members proves resilient beyond the immediate trade détente.
After last year’s doubts, that alone is significant.
About the author
Shameek Godara
Shameek Godara is a Senior Associate in The Asia Group’s Australia practice, based in Canberra, where he supports clients on issues spanning national security, defence, and the energy and extractives sectors.
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