Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was asked during a National Press Club appearance this month whether China was a security threat to Australia. Here’s what he had to say:
“I think that our engagement with the region and the world needs to be diplomatic, needs to be mature and needs to avoid the, you know, attempts to simplify what are a complex set of relationships.”
When pressed, he added:
“We have strategic competition in the region. We have that, we have a Defence Strategic Review which outlines what Australia’s defence needs are. And we engage constructively in the region, including with China and including with ASEAN nations.”
Fortunately, the respondents to the Lowy Institute Poll are required to be more direct. In 2025, 69 per cent of respondents saw it as very likely or somewhat likely that China would become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, down from a high of 75 per cent in 2022 and 2023.
Around the same percentage – 67 per cent – support Australia acquiring nuclear powered submarines. And 60 per cent favour doing more to work with allies to deter China’s use of military force. Fewer – 51 per cent – support Australia spending more on defence (though we do not know by how much, and at what cost to other spending). Just 51 per cent say they feel very safe or safe, when reflecting on world events. And when it comes to threats to Australia’s security, 61 per cent saw a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan as a critical threat over the next ten years.
Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles is more forthcoming than Albanese. At the recent Defending Australia summit, hosted by The Australian newspaper, Marles made the following points, which at least reiterate the gist of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (rather than just referring to its existence):
“In terms of our own defence capability needs, our risk is not so much the invasion of the continent. We are fortunate that we are an island nation surrounded by oceans, but on the other hand, we are deeply reliant on our sea lines of communication. The supply of the country – almost all of our liquid fuels are imported by sea, but also through export revenues. And so that is our strategic risk. It’s the disruption of those sea lines.”
When pressed in the question-and-answer session, Marles elaborated on concerns about China’s rapid build-up of conventional military and nuclear forces.
Albanese and Marles could also have reasonably pointed out, as Foreign Minister Penny Wong has done, that Australia has concerns about aspects of China’s behaviour, like its military cooperation with Russia and coercive and dangerous actions towards the Philippines and Taiwan.
What is required is a willingness by the Prime Minister to speak more directly about Australia’s strategic circumstances.
The results of the 2025 Lowy Institute Poll suggest that Albanese could be much more forthcoming with Australians about the strategic circumstances we face. This doesn’t need to mean explicitly labelling China a threat, like Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney did recently. Australians already get the picture and most understand that, on balance, relations with China will be more competitive than cooperative in future. There’s little evidence from the results of previous Lowy Institute polls that Australians want their political leaders to take an overtly confrontational approach to Beijing, either. In 2024, just 45 per cent wanted Australians to do more to work with allies to deter China’s use of military force, even if it meant harming the relationship with China.
Instead, what is required is a willingness by the Prime Minister to speak more directly about Australia’s strategic circumstances, including the challenge posed by China, and the policy responses that are required to meet the moment. Without such a clear conceptual framework around the strategic and foreign policy debate in Australia, the government’s responses to pressure from the United States for increased defence spending risk appearing reactive and defensive.
