As the Russian invasion of Ukraine has laid bare the brutality of the campaign, there have been increasing debates over whether it constitutes genocide. On 12 April, US President Joe Biden accused Russia of committing genocide, later clarifying that he “called it genocide because it has become clearer and clearer that Putin is just trying to wipe out the idea of being able to be Ukrainian”.
Biden’s declaration has come after prolific public debate by experts, who largely agree that it is too early to determine whether there exists an intention to destroy, in whole or in part, the Ukrainian people. Intention to commit genocide is exceptionally hard to prove. Indications of such intent are rarely overt, and while it can be established indirectly by inference, it must be the only inference available.
So, does it matter whether Russia is committing genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, collectively referred to as atrocity crimes?
While atrocity crimes are ongoing, the distinction should determine policy makers’ response. As Russia’s war aims and strategy have changed and Russian propaganda has increasingly turned genocidal, regardless of whether Russia is in fact already committing genocide, it matters that there is a serious risk of it occurring.
The treaty that legally defines genocide, the Genocide Convention, imposes on the 152 State parties an obligation “to prevent and to punish” the crime. In 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) clarified that “this obviously does not mean that the obligation to prevent genocide only comes into being when perpetration of genocide commences”. Rather, the ICJ emphasised that “a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed”.
While it is difficult to predetermine whether acts will constitute genocide, some specific warning signs for genocide that are present in Ukraine include denying the existence of the group, genocidal propaganda, dehumanising violence, and the removal of Ukrainian children.
There is a false belief that the Genocide Convention “requires countries to intervene once genocide is formally identified”. Such a narrative might raise false hopes with the people of Ukraine should a genocide be declared but no military intervention is forthcoming.
The Convention is silent on what states should do to prevent genocide. The ICJ has stated that the obligation “is one of conduct and not of result”, insofar as states must “employ all means reasonably available to them” to prevent genocide “as far as possible”. A state can be held responsible where it manifestly fails to take measures within its power that might contribute to preventing genocide. It is, in effect, a due diligence standard. States must do what they can.