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New Caledonia, explained.
About the author
Denise Fisher
Denise Fisher is a Visiting Fellow at ANU's Centre for European Studies.
Topics
On Sunday 11 May elections were held in New Caledonia. They will have a big impact on the future of the French territory.
These were the final elections under the 1998 Noumea Accord. This Accord, building on the 1988 Matignon Accords, put an end to bloodshed over demands for independence. They endorsed a democratically elected local Congress and postponed an independence vote to some time between 2014 and 2019. It is this newly elected Congress that will decide the future of New Caledonia.
If three-fifths of the Congress agree, a referendum process will begin, and centre on three issues: the future international status of New Caledonia, the transfer of some key responsibilities currently in French hands, and citizenship issues such as voting and employment rights. If representatives cannot agree, France itself must hold a referendum.
Politics in New Caledonia revolve around favouring independence or staying with France. The pro-France groups have consistently held the majority in the four elections since the Accord was signed, despite voting being restricted to longstanding residents (a response to Kanak concerns at being outnumbered by inflows of metropolitan French). But since 1998 both pro-France and pro-independence groups have become fragmented and divided, perhaps contributing to increasing voter complacency; turnout was only 67% this time, compared to 74% in 1999 (and 76% in 2004, 72% in 2009).
This time, neither the pro-France nor the pro-independence group won a sufficient number of seats to ensure a three-fifths majority in their own right. [fold]
The pro-France group has paid the price of division, winning only 29 of the 54 Congress seats. The pro-independence group has been sufficiently disciplined to not only win 25 Congress seats (compared to 23 in 2009) but also to secure 7 of the 40 provincial seats in the mainly pro-France Southern Province.
These results mean that the leader of the largest single group, the pro-France Caledonie Ensemble, Philippe Gomes, will need to reach out not only to other pro-France groups in the Congress but also to the pro-independence groups as the Congress addresses the difficult post-Noumea Accord referendum issues.
There are three encouraging aspects to these elections.
These three factors, along with the weaker majority of the pro-France group in the Congress, contribute to a political imperative for each major group to accommodate the other as the difficult discussions about the future of New Caledonia proceed. These difficulties should not be underestimated. The differences are wide. But an examination of their respective positions outlined during the campaign points to scope for cooperation.
In the pro-France camp (29 seats), all groups with representation in the 2014 Congress want New Caledonia to stay with France, but with significant nuances.
For their part, with the exception of the left wing Labour Party, the pro-independence groups (25 seats) are focused on 'sovereignty' and 'emancipation' rather than independence, suggesting room for compromise.
When taken together, these features of the latest New Caledonian elections form a basis for considered discussion and compromise in the coming final term under the Noumea Accord, and deserve close attention and support from Australia.
Denise Fisher