Military tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to increase. China’s People’s Liberation Army has stepped up exercises simulating blockades, showing Beijing’s growing pressure. Against this tense backdrop, Taiwan’s former president Ma Ying-jeou this month travelled to Xiamen in China to join an annual conference known as the Straits Forum, organised by China for exchanges on cross-Strait relations. Ma served in the top job from 2008 to 2016 and is now retired. He is affiliated with the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), a party known for supporting closer ties with China.
Ma attended the forum as a private citizen under the auspices of the “19 Academy” – a cultural youth program promoting shared Chinese heritage. Unlike previous visits by sitting KMT officials, Ma held no formal government or party role during this visit. Still, given his status as a former president, his presence carried political significance. Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was quick to criticise the event as part of Beijing’s “United Front” efforts to cultivate political influence, while Ma’s foundation defended it as a gesture of cultural exchange.
To fully grasp why Ma’s trip drew such controversy, one must recall how Taiwan’s youth-led political awakening a decade ago reshaped public attitudes toward China – and toward Ma himself. Crucially, Ma’s return to the cross-Strait spotlight recalls a pivotal moment in recent Taiwanese history: the 2014 Sunflower Movement.
That year, student protesters occupied Taiwan’s legislature to oppose a trade deal that Ma’s government had struck with Beijing. Students argued the deal was advanced without proper democratic review. This “Sunflower Movement” sparked a political awakening among Taiwan’s youth, increasing scepticism about closer ties with China. The movement weakened public trust in Ma and the KMT, effects still felt today. Ma’s 2025 return to cross-Strait engagement, even in a cultural guise, reopens unresolved debates about how Taiwan should interact with Beijing – especially among the post-Sunflower generation.
Ma’s 2025 visit is, in part, an effort to reframe the KMT’s China strategy, which has struggled to regain credibility among younger voters in the past decade. By emphasising cultural commonality – shared language, religious traditions such as Mazu worship, and familial ties – Ma seeks to identify a “safe zone” for cross-Strait engagement, distinct from the more fraught arenas of sovereignty and security.
But cultural diplomacy, while low-risk in theory, is politically charged in practice. The DPP views such gestures as dangerously naïve or even complicit with Beijing’s agenda. The KMT, by contrast, frames them as necessary channels for reducing friction – especially in a context where formal cross-Strait dialogue is frozen and US–China rivalry is intensifying.
When KMT figures visit China, critics call it capitulation; when DPP leaders meet Western officials, Beijing sees a tilt toward independence.
This domestic cleavage has strategic implications. Taiwan’s two major parties increasingly use China policy not just to guide foreign relations, but to define their political identities. Ma’s trip thus serves as a flashpoint in a broader battle over national direction. The KMT, now controlling the legislature in coalition with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) – the island’s largest third party – is pushing back against what it sees as the DPP’s overly confrontational posture. The DPP, for its part, warns that such visits could be exploited by Beijing to divide and co-opt Taiwan internally.
The real danger lies not in such engagement itself, but in misperception. Just as Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the US House of Representatives, visited Taiwan in 2022 – a move seen by Taipei as democratic solidarity but by Beijing as provocation – cross-Strait gestures are now refracted through a lens of strategic distrust. A similar dynamic applies within Taiwan: when KMT figures visit China, critics call it capitulation; when DPP leaders meet Western officials, Beijing sees a tilt toward independence. Misreading is no longer incidental – it has become a structural feature of cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s domestic politics.
Despite sharp partisan debates, public opinion remains more cautious. Surveys by National Chengchi University consistently show more than 60 per cent of Taiwanese support maintaining the status quo – not unification with China, not formal independence. This pragmatic centrism is at odds with the binary narratives offered by both parties, and it underscores the risks of misreading domestic gestures like Ma’s visit as signals of strategic realignment.
The international community, particularly observers of Indo-Pacific dynamics, should interpret such developments with care. Cultural overtures like Ma’s may not signal policy shifts but reflect the constraints of Taiwan’s polarised democracy. In a political climate where misperception – both between and within states – has become structural, even symbolic gestures are vulnerable to distortion.
Still, cultural diplomacy remains one of the few remaining tools for cross-Strait contact. It cannot resolve the core disputes between Beijing and Taipei, but it can help manage tensions and preserve space for dialogue. In a region increasingly defined by zero-sum logic, this space matters.
Three measures could help.
Firstly, support for informal ‘Track II’ exchanges – involving academics, artists, and cultural leaders – to maintain contact outside formal diplomatic frameworks.
Secondly, encouraging bipartisan dialogue in Taiwan that frames China policy as a matter of long-term national interest, rather than short-term partisan gain.
Thirdly, promoting multilateral forums – involving both Taiwan and China under broader themes such as environmental or heritage cooperation – where indirect engagement is possible without a compromise on questions of sovereignty.
While cultural diplomacy cannot solve the core political disputes, it plays a vital role in reducing misunderstandings and preventing conflict escalation. Ma Ying-jeou’s visit may not alter the trajectory of Taiwan-China relations. But in a world where diplomacy is shrinking and mistrust is growing, even flawed gestures have utility. If understanding cannot be restored, it can still be made less dangerous.
