G20, explained.
President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, left, meeting with US President Donald Trump in the White House on 21 May 2025 (Daniel Torok/Official White House Photo)
Ramaphosa is making a risky bet in a bid to progress an economic and development agenda the US President doesn’t believe in.
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With the G20 summit looming, South Africa wants Trump at the tableWith the G20 summit looming, South Africa wants Trump at the table
In November, South Africa will host the G20 Leaders’ Summit, the first to take place on African soil. It will also be the fourth consecutive host in the Global South, following meetings in Indonesia, India and Brazil. Issues that continue to burden many developing countries will be the focus, with South Africa having championed priorities such as debt relief, climate finance, and development.
But a cloud hangs over this G20. US President Donald Trump initially declared he would boycott the summit over claims of “white genocide” in South Africa, also directing US officials not to participate in the wider G20 agenda. Now he has indicated he may attend, following a meeting last month with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa. Trump’s apparent change of course could signal an easing of tensions, which is especially significant as South Africa prepares to hand over the G20 presidency to the United States as host for next year.
This comes amid a review of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a US trade agreement that provides duty-free access for eligible African countries to US markets. South Africa is one of its largest beneficiaries.
A lead-up meeting held at IMF headquarters in Washington ahead of the G20 summit in South Africa in November (G20 SA)
Ramaphosa’s decision to meet Trump was criticised at home, given Trump’s history of racially charged rhetoric and confrontational diplomacy. Scenes of Trump flicking through reports that supposedly showed the deaths of white farmers made for awkward headlines – not least because many turned out to be erroneous. The broader issue is South Africa’s high crime rate, of which farm attacks form a small part. Most farm murders are linked to robbery, not an orchestrated campaign targeting white farmers. South Africa’s justice system is straining: barely one in ten murder cases are solved, and just 13 per cent lead to a conviction. These institutional failings affect everyone, not just farmers.
Still, Ramaphosa reported the visit as “substantive”, hoping the meeting would reset relations between the two countries.
South Africa’s challenge will be to protect its interests without compromising the “principled, non-aligned stance” it has long claimed.
Trump’s focus on white farmers isn’t new, but it carries political weight. It resonates with parts of the US right and reinforces the kind of cultural grievance politics observed in the recent US elections. It also indirectly aligns with criticisms of South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, which require international businesses to offer a 30 per cent equity stake to historically disadvantaged groups, which Elon Musk has labelled as “openly racist.” Musk’s Starlink could significantly help South Africa’s economy by improving digital connectivity, particularly in underserved rural areas. With more than 40% of South Africans still lacking internet access, improved connectivity could stimulate local economies through remote learning, telemedicine, and online business, expanding employment opportunities.
Although South Africa maintains a non-aligned foreign policy, in recent years it has deepened ties with non-Western partners, particularly through its BRICS membership. It is also not the first time that South Africa has flip-flopped on its political allegiances.
In October 2024, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) instructed Taiwan’s liaison office to relocate from Pretoria to Johannesburg and change its name, essentially downgrading Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the country. The move appeared aimed at pleasing Beijing amid growing ties with China and other BRICS partners. Still, ostracising Taipei risked undermining South Africa’s democratic values, and harming its economic relationship with Taiwan, which includes US$2 billion in annual trade and 40,000 local jobs. The move also risked damaging relations with the United States, which views Taiwan as a key ally.
Ramaphosa’s decision to engage with Trump may have signalled a broader attempt to stabilise relations with the United States, protect key trade agreements including AGOA, and limit the impact of recent diplomatic and economic tensions. The US aid cuts have already had a severe effect on South Africa’s health system, especially its HIV response, where a US-funded program provided US$407 million in support.
The US is also South Africa’s second-largest trading partner after China, and Trump’s threat to impose 30 per cent tariffs poses a considerable economic risk. Meanwhile, Washington’s expulsion of South Africa’s ambassador and criticism over South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice have only added to the growing tensions.
As South Africa prepares to hand over the G20 presidency later in the year, Ramaphosa’s recent meeting with Trump signals an attempt to mitigate tensions and protect its economy. The potential benefits of mending ties with the US are significant. It also aims to ensure that South Africa’s G20 presidency leaves a legacy, likely aiming to safeguard the priorities it has championed, such as climate finance and debt relief. But the risks are just as serious, including compromising its democratic values, weakening ties with other trade partners, and appearing overly responsive to the demands of an unpredictable US leader.
South Africa’s challenge will be to protect its interests without compromising the “principled, non-aligned stance” it has long claimed, even as recent decisions suggest a pattern of shifting allegiances based on national priorities.
About the author
Isel van Zyl
Isel van Zyl is a researcher and project manager specialising in violent extremism, conflict, and human security.
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