Published daily by the Lowy Institute

Governor Tim Walz and Minnesota’s relations with China

Supine? His record says no, but he’s not a strategist, either.

Democratic vice presidential candidate Minnesota Governor Tim Walz at a rally on 2 October 2024 in York, Pennsylvania (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)
Democratic vice presidential candidate Minnesota Governor Tim Walz at a rally on 2 October 2024 in York, Pennsylvania (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)
Published 9 Oct 2024 

China again looms large in the US presidential election campaign. Republican critics have in recent weeks honed their attacks Tim Walz, running mate of Kamala Harris, and the reported 30 trips he’s made to China dating back to a 1989 teaching stint in Foshan.

Speculation has swirled that Walz’s frequent trips to China indicate pro-communist leanings, even implying he was “groomed” as a “Manchurian candidate”. Some pointed to his early writings showing an interest in communism, suggesting he benefited from ties with Chinese authorities. Others highlighted his support for engagement with China and criticism of the trade war. Critics also noted his contacts with diplomats from the People’s Republic and Minnesota-based Chinese organizations linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front network, which aims to shape foreign perspectives in favour of China. In August, Republican House Oversight Chairman James Comer requested the FBI to investigate Walz’s ties to the CCP.

The Harris campaign and Walz himself downplay his connections to China, while mainstream media analysts highlight his support for Hong Kong democracy activists, the Dalai Lama and his criticism of CCP human rights abuses. They argue that his “long relationship with China defies easy stereotypes” and “should be seen as an asset, not a liability. PRC commentators agree, saying Walz’s knowledge of China could help improve US-China relations.

What has been overlooked, however, is Walz’s gubernatorial policies on China. More than his high school teaching or Congressional record, they highlight his potential to navigate the complex dynamics of US-China relations as an executive leader.

His subnational diplomacy towards China was directionless, neither informed by American values or security concerns, nor even the “pragmatic” objective of expanding Minnesota’s economic relations with China.

Minnesota’s relations with China date back to the mid-19th century and grew after the US recognition of China in 1979. My recent and forthcoming studies argue that Minnesota experienced “China fever” twice. In the 1980s, it concluded sister-state agreements with Shaanxi Province (and Taiwan), with 80 Minnesota-based companies (including Cargill) investing in China by 1989. In the 2000s, Governors Tim Pawlenty (a Republican) and Mark Dayton (from the Democratic Party) reinvigorated this relationship, leading trade missions and opening offices in Shanghai.

By 2019, when Walz became the governor, China was Minnesota’s third-largest export market, and the state attracted $2.7 billion in Chinese investment. Two Minnesota universities hosted Confucian Institutes and benefited from the influx of Chinese students to their undergraduate and postgraduate programs. And, the Minnesota Trade Office has long designated the US-China Peoples Friendship Association of Minnesota, a United Front agency, to manage the state’s relationship with Shaanxi.

If Walz had close ties to the Chinese Party-state as critics claim, they were not evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. Walz, as Minnesota governor, during a May 2021 vaccination drive at Saint Paul RiverCentre (Nikolas Liepins/Official Governor’s Office Photo)
If Walz had close ties to the Chinese Party-state as critics claim, they were not evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. Walz, as Minnesota governor, during a May 2021 vaccination drive at Saint Paul RiverCentre (Nikolas Liepins/Official Governor’s Office Photo)

When running to become governor, Walz capitalised on his China ties when seeking Chinese votes and donations. After the election, he invited the PRC Consul General to his inauguration, opposed the trade war and attended United Front events. Unlike governors in more than 30 states, Walz neither banned TikTok from state-issued devices nor sought to fortify his state against perceived Chinese interference in food supplies, technology and energy.

However, Walz was not exceptional in doing so. As a candidate, he could not ignore the 40,000 Chinese voters in Minnesota’s urban centres. Numerous governors routinely invite PRC diplomats to their inaugurations, and during the 2018 gubernatorial election, all candidates (including Republicans) criticised the trade war, as did farmers and retailers.

At the same time, Walz did not court Beijing. In 2019, he did not attend the fifth US-China Governors Forum, hosted by Kentucky’s Republican governor, nor visit China, unlike Republican governors of Arkansas and Indiana. Instead, he travelled to Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Finland. Unlike governors of California, Michigan and Pennsylvania, Walz is not an active TikTok user.

Walz did not intervene in the University of Minnesota’s decision to close the Confucius Institute. Since 2019, he has awarded certificates to “leaders and practitioners of Falun Dafa”, an organisation banned in China.

If Walz had the close ties to the Chinese Party-state that critics claim, they were not evident during the Covid-19 pandemic, as Minnesota did not benefit from Beijing’s mask diplomacy like other states, including New York. After the pandemic, Walz did not seek a meeting with Xi Jinping, unlike California Governor Gavin Newsom, nor did he meet with Ambassador Qin Gang during his 2022 visit to Minnesota. Walz only met with the PRC Consul General in March 2024, after the Biden administration resumed dialogue with China.

Finally, Walz quietly shifted Minnesota’s approach to Taiwan, meeting Taiwan’s de facto Consul General and publicly thanking him for donating 100,000 masks. In 2022, his Department of Agriculture opened a trade office in Taipei, and the Department of Education partnered with Taiwan’s Ministry of Education to expand Chinese language teaching. Yet, unlike at least nine other governors, Walz did not travel to Taiwan, and the Minnesota office opened with little fanfare and a modest budget.

Walz has embellished his experience with China. Recently, his campaign had to clarify that he had travelled to China about 15 times, not 30. During the vice-presidential debate last week, Walz admitted that he had not visited Hong Kong during the Tiananmen Square protests in May 1989, saying he had “misspoke” having instead visited a few months later. However, neither his trips to China (or their timing) nor his role on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China seemed to have helped him develop a distinctive approach to China during his tenure as governor of Minnesota.

Seeking not to antagonise the CCP regime and not to appear pro-CCP, Walz did not position Minnesota against China, as Florida and Texas did, nor did he appease the Xi regime for economic gain, as California and New York did. As a result, his subnational diplomacy towards China was directionless, neither informed by American values or security concerns, nor even the “pragmatic” objective of expanding Minnesota’s economic relations with China.

Walz’s gubernatorial record does not suggest that he is a brilliant geo-strategist on the China issue, or that his “unusually extensive personal experience in China” could “help him as veep” by “mak[ing] up for Harris’s shortcomings in China policy”. If elected, Harris should think carefully before entrusting her China policy to her VP.




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