Confidence is declining in global climate diplomacy. The familiar multilateral institutions in the field are fractured and struggling to remain relevant to address a rapidly worsening climate crisis.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House, having again withdrawn the United States from the Paris Agreement, has left a major void. At COP29 last year, the United States had pledged US $11 billion in climate finance, making it the largest bilateral donor. Its withdrawal marks a serious setback for collective climate ambition. Meanwhile, Europe’s climate leadership is also on the decline. The political right is pushing to shelve green policies in favour of reindustrialisation and away from renewable energy, while a military build-up is also drawing on stretched public finances – all suggesting a sharp retreat from the EU’s climate ambitions.
This political backsliding is evident in recent climate negotiations. The Bonn Climate Change Conference ended in a deadlock over the agenda, where consensus could not be reached over climate finance. Minimal progress was also made on loss and damage questions. Trust between developed and developing countries remains low, and the outcomes from Bonn did little to suggest that global climate talks later this year will deliver a breakthrough.
While the Global North takes a spasmodic interest in the climate crisis, the Global South is left facing the reality of the intensifying effects of climate change. In this vacuum, alternative forums are beginning to emerge. Could BRICS be one of them?
Climate was a front-burner issue at the BRICS summit in Rio last month, emphasising the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Brazil will also host COP30 in Belém in November, with the goal to mobilise US $1.3 trillion in climate finance for the Global South. The BRICS Rio Declaration this year focused on climate finance, with a commitment to reform the international financial system. It encouraged stronger intra-BRICS cooperation on climate-resilient development and green industrialisation. The commitments already seem to be partially in motion. The New Development Bank, founded by the BRICS members in 2014, is committed to directing 40 per cent of its financing towards climate goals by 2026. Already, 45 per cent of its finance is directed towards adaptation, which compares to the World Bank at only 33 per cent. Though NDB’s volumes are still modest, its portfolio reflects a demand-driven approach aligned with the development needs of its members.
BRICS also brings weight. With an expanded membership, the bloc now represents more than 45 per cent of the world’s population and nearly 30 per cent of global GDP. Intra-BRICS trade grew by 85 per cent over the past decade, outpacing trade with the rest of the world. A growing share of transactions is now conducted in local currencies. For example, 95 per cent of China–Russia trade and 90 per cent of India–Russia trade bypasses the US dollar, reducing dependency on Western financial institutions. The BRICS holds 72 per cent of global rare earth reserves, which are critical to enable clean technologies, such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles. If managed cooperatively, these reserves could support a more just model of green industrialisation and one that does not replicate the extractive patterns of traditional development.
With India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi suggesting an alternative acronym for the bloc – “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability” – to escape the association with the founding members, it also suggests a stronger push for development-oriented climate cooperation.
Yet its ability to lead remains uncertain. BRICS faces internal and structural challenges. Political divisions such as India-China relations remain. Major BRICS members are also still structurally tied to fossil fuels, like India and China driving demand, and Russia dependent on exports, and Brazil’s continued deforestation.
Institutionally, the bloc has no binding climate targets or enforcement mechanisms. While the members were aligned on climate sentiments, the Rio summit only produced a declaration rather than a roadmap.
Moreover, BRICS has yet to present a coherent alternative vision. Its climate stance remains largely reactive and framed in opposition to the West.
Still, BRICS offers something the current global climate order does not: a platform grounded in the development realities of the Global South. For countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, climate change is a present emergency. BRICS is beginning to reflect that urgency.
The presidency of BRICS next shifts to India in 2026. With India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi suggesting an alternative acronym for the bloc – “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability” – to escape the association with the founding members, it also suggests a stronger push for development-oriented climate cooperation. A deeper South-South alignment would add more institutional muscle behind the drive for climate justice. If steered with ambition and clarity, BRICS could move closer to becoming the climate voice the Global South urgently needs.
