The 11th principle of war is personality, muses Brigadier Dean Thompson as we talk at an airbase in the Philippines. Relationships matter.
Australia’s relationship with the Philippines has reached a new level of convergence, coming at a time of tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and unease in the region flowing from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. This August saw the second iteration of Exercise ALON, a joint military exercise between Australia and the Philippines. Notably, the exercise takes part only in uncontested areas of the South China Sea.
If conflict broke out, this is just part of what Australia would have to do to defend itself and the region
I was invited by Joint Operations Command to an academic embed program in the Philippines to learn about the exercise. The inclusion of academics who teach, research and publish in this field is an invaluable way of connecting with the public.
The first Exercise ALON between Australia and the Philippines in 2023 was amphibious: Alon means “wave” in Tagalog. This time around, however, it was a joint operation and multi-service exercise involving army, navy and air force across the five domains (water, land, air, space, and cyber), as well as roles for observer nations such as Canada, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the United States. The exercise also required one of the largest airlifts of Australian forces in the Indo-Pacific region since 1999 to Timor-Leste. This meant moving the troops on more than 27 flights using just six C-17 military transport aircraft. If conflict broke out, this is just part of what Australia would have to do to defend itself and the region. It’s an extraordinary feat of logistics and one worth practising.
Operationally, the exercise was about joint force projection and freedom of manoeuvre. The Philippines has a much higher population density than Australia and the heat and humidity is challenging. It’s one thing to practise operations at home; quite another to make it work extraterritorially, and remain in accordance with international law, Australian law, and the law of the Philippines: everything from constitutional requirements and mariners’ notices to compliance with workplace health and safety and the storage of explosives.
Strategically, Exercise ALON is also about deterrence and the need to keep the region peaceful. The United States has traditionally been the key Western partner for the Philippines, but that relationship has changed. It also comes at a time when Australia’s own relationship with the United States is less predictable and when a broad range of strategic alliances are needed.
The Philippines (under the current government, at least) is pivoting focus from internal counter-terrorism to territorial defence against hostilities. Australia and the Philippines share an important strategic alliance at this point in history, and it is well time they got to know one another better. The current Philippines government provides a window of opportunity to do this. I am told on multiple occasions that Australian forces are consciously taking a respectful approach to cooperation in the Philippines. As we are told many times from a range of ranks and services, “Unlike the Americans, we ask, we don’t tell.” And “we also have a lot to learn from the Philippines too, including on jungle warfare”.
On our tour, though, it is Australians we meet, and we tour their aircraft. The personnel are impressive – professional, confident, and earnest.
For these reasons and others, as Colonel McLeod Wood explains, ALON has expanded to multi-service and multi-domain operations, including land operability, special operations, search and seizure of a sea vessel, search and rescue (military), urban warfare, counter-landing deployment (i.e. repelling a force arriving by sea), and a live-fire exercise aimed at a floating target.
In addition to a briefing on the exercise, we meet air force personnel on a tour of Clark Air Base. First established as a US military base after the Spanish-American War in 1898, it is named for Major Harold M. Clark, a pre-First World War pilot. After Japan occupied the Philippines during the Second World War, the airfield became a major Japanese base of operations. Reportedly, the first (successful) Japanese kamikaze flight was made from Clark in 1944. After the Second World War, Clark Air Base became the largest US military air base outside the United States; and essential to connecting US forces in the region, including in South Korea and Vietnam. However, a volcanic eruption led to the United States withdrawing and handing the base back to the Philippine government in the 1990s. Now, the base is known as the Clark Freeport Zone and parts are occupied by the Philippine Air Force. On our tour, though, it is Australians we meet, and we look over their aircraft. The personnel are impressive – professional, confident, and earnest. Pilots’ names are marked on the sides of aircraft. An army representative with us laughs and says that while army may name their vehicles, they don’t put their own names on them. “That’s the air force for you,” he chuckles.
We also meet with the Australian Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, who believes a missing element of the global discussion on the Ukraine conflict is the importance of an air force that has the capabilities to minimise, and potentially avoid, drawn-out attritional-style conflict, the likes of which can be seen in Russian aggression towards Ukraine.
I soon learn that the exercise raises a number of interesting and important legal issues. These relate to questions around Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), principles of international law on territory, sovereignty, maritime and air domains, and human rights. The extraterritorial application of Australian laws remains a live issue, as does the intersection of the law of the nation hosting visiting forces. There are specific rules of engagement that govern the exercise, so as to allow personnel to practise adhering to those rules in a practical context.
The status of allied military forces in a foreign territory, and the impact of an agreement providing for the stationing of those forces, creates a number of legal issues. In the Philippines, there must be a Status of Forces Agreement to have foreign troops posted. Those countries without an agreement must restrict their operations to the Exclusive Economic Zone. This is because under Article XVIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, section 25 provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities are not allowed in the Philippines other than under a treaty passed by parliament.
On one hand, this relates to technical legal questions around jurisdiction. On the other, it has much to do with perceptions of abuse of political power in negotiating treaties. For example, an article analysing the history of negotiating SOFAs between the Philippines and the United States in the 1990s noted that, “any educated Filipinos consider the [US] bases a vestige of colonialism and an infringement on Philippine sovereignty”, which also made them a “magnet” for nuclear attack. While written in the context of the US and Philippines relationship, sensitivities nonetheless remain around the issue of sovereignty in the Philippines. For example, the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP) condemned “in the strongest terms the increasing foreign military presence in the Philippines via Exercise ALON”, and a new deal between Australia and the Philippines.
Ultimately, the exercise has, for now at least, brought the Philippines-Australia relationship into sharper focus.
Notably, from a civil preparedness perspective, section 4 of the Constitution of the Philippines sets out that the government “may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfilment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service”. Other provisions of note include requiring the Philippines government to pursue an “independent foreign policy” and to treat as “paramount” the considerations of “national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination”. Significantly, there are provisions “adopting and pursuing a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory”, “ensuring the autonomy of local governments”, and recognising “the role of women in nation-building” and the “fundamental equality before the law of women and men”. There is also a provision for the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. All this provides context for sensitivity in the Philippines population to perceptions of foreign power and its relationship to national sovereignty.
The Australian Constitution is mostly silent on many of these issues and is largely permissive when it comes to legislative and executive powers relating to Defence (though with limits around proportionality) but, in short, does allow the Commonwealth to legislate with extraterritorial effect. This means relevant laws do follow Australia’s troops. On that, there are broader questions as to which court is appropriate – civilian vs military – for a member of the armed forces accused of committing a criminal offence, either in Australia or extraterritorially. I heard strong views during this embed program (and from more than one serviceperson) that the better path is to refer that person straight to the civilian criminal justice system, rather than deal with criminal matters internally. That view posits that internal systems should be reserved for breaches of internal Australian Defence Force rules only, and that any conduct potentially attracting criminal liability should be for the civilian courts.
Ultimately, the exercise has, for now at least, brought the Philippines-Australia relationship into sharper focus, and allowed our troops to meaningfully rehearse for what may lie ahead.
Thanks are owed to in-country escort Flight Lieutenant Allisha Harvey, and to Squadron Leader Eamon Hamilton for his assistance.
