Bangladesh, explained.
A Bangladeshi ceremonial border guard at the India-Bangladesh border on the outskirts of Siliguri (Diptendu Dutta/AFP via Getty Images)
Appointing a career politician as high commissioner to Dhaka breaks recent convention – a deliberate bet on personal chemistry over experience.
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India’s Bangladesh gambleIndia’s Bangladesh gamble
In years gone by, New Delhi has sent some of its brightest diplomats as envoys to Dhaka. This is generally considered a norm for the neighbourhood, a signal about the importance of ties. Old habits of appointing politicians to the ambassadorial positions has been consigned to the past, unofficially given up to adopt a tradition that sending career diplomats.
All of which makes the appointment of a established politician as India’s new high commissioner to Bangladesh this month a break with several unwritten protocols.
At one level, this move is likely part of New Delhi’s broader effort to reset its frayed bilateral ties with Dhaka – strained since the overthrow of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, a close partner to New Delhi now living in exile in India.
On the other hand, it could be a gamble.
India’s new man in Dhaka is Dinesh Trivedi, a politician from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the state of West Bengal. He served as a minister in the Union Cabinet when he was previously with the Congress party. He had a long stint in the Trinamool Congress (TMC) as well, the ruling party West Bengal, before joining the BJP in 2021.
The BJP supporter base has been particularly aminated about the protection of the rights of the Hindu minorities in Bangladesh, a concern that has come to dominate the relationship in the years since Hasina’s downfall. This will be just one of a number of tricky challenges for Trivedi to navigate.
Dinesh Trivedi, centre, in 2021 after joined the BJP, New Delhi, India (Arvind Yadav/Hindustan Times via Getty Images)
West Bengal, part of the Bengal Presidency in colonial India, was the product of the partition of the province by the British colonial masters in 1905. Although the decision was annulled in 1911, Muslim-majority East Bengal became a part of Pakistan as the British left the subcontinent in 1947. In 1971, it became an independent country with India’s assistance and adopted the name Bangladesh – the land of Bengalis or country of Bengal.
Trivedi’s Bengal connections must have been a consideration for New Delhi as it faces a flurry of expectations and demands from the new Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government led by Tarique Rahman.
At the top of Dhaka’s immediate requests is New Delhi’s support to deal with the acute energy crisis that has erupted in the country triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran. Bangladesh relies on the Middle East for nearly 63% of its crude oil and has been forced to adopt a series of power-conserving measures, including the closure of universities and daily fuel sale restrictions. A prolonged war could reduce Bangladesh’s GDP by up to 3%.
During a visit to New Delhi this month – the first such high-level contact between the two governments since BNP came to power in Dhaka – Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman met India’s Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Hardeep Singh Puri to ask for an increase in diesel and fertiliser supply. Puri reportedly indicated the request would be considered favourably once India’s domestic requirements were met.
For New Delhi, it will help if Dhaka blinks first.
India continues to receive oil from Russia and other sources, so supplying diesel at market rates to Dhaka via existing pipelines is a relatively simple option for New Delhi. Granting other requests may be much more challenging.
Rahman also met India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on 8 April, but a brief press release afterwards offered little detail about the discussion. Rahman didn’t speak to the Indian press while in New Delhi, although a television channel caught up with him in Port Louis, Mauritius, his next stop to attend the 9th Indian Ocean Conference, an MEA-sponsored event.
In that interview and others on 10 April, Rahman did open up – albeit still with brief details – about what transpired during his Delhi meetings. He said he raised the issue of Hasina’s extradition – she faces a death sentence for atrocities committed during the student protests in 2024. On 17 April 2026, a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson said that Dhaka’s request under an extradition treaty between the two countries “is being examined as part of ongoing judicial and internal legal processes.” This has been New Delhi’s refrain since last year. It looks like India is unlikely to give up on a former ally in case the tide turns in the future.
The renewal of the Ganges water-sharing treaty that expires in December 2026 is another issue that bedevils relations between the two countries. Negotiations need to start for its renewal, which will not occur without tough bargaining. While Dhaka wishes for “equitable and climate-proof” water sharing, its agriculture and food security could be at risk if the treaty expires without a replacement.
New Delhi believes that it holds enough cards to keep Bangladesh’s more ambitious demands in check. It is hoping that an early visit by PM Tarique Rahman to India will help. Dhaka, interestingly, appears to be using a similar tactic. It knows that any increase in Pakistan and China’s profile in Bangladesh raises New Delhi’s concerns. Chinese financing, infrastructure, and defence ties have expanded across the South Asian region. Rahman mentioned, “Our relationship with India or China is not a zero‑sum game. If there are worries, we expect our Indian friends to state them clearly with specifics.”
For New Delhi, it will help if Dhaka blinks first. Dhaka is holding out, seeking a meaningful and reciprocal relationship with India.
It is here that Trivedi’s experience as a Bengali politician may be useful, a person able to draw on previous experience and proximity to smooth ties. Managing expectations could be an arduous task.
About the author
Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
Dr Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is the founder and president of Mantraya Institute for Strategic Studies (MISS), a senior research fellow at University of Massachusetts Amherst, and visiting faculty at the Naval War College, Goa, India.
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