Distance from the world’s geopolitical fault lines offers scant protection. Australia has experienced its own tragic history of politically motivated violence targeting diplomats.
In December 1980, the Turkish Consul-General was assassinated alongside his bodyguard in Sydney by suspected members of an Armenian militant group, in what became Australia’s first known political assassination of a foreign official – one for which the perpetrators have never been found.
Earlier Cold War-era attacks targeted Yugoslav diplomatic missions, including a 1972 bombing of the Yugoslav Trade Centre in Sydney, highlighting the violent spillover of diaspora nationalism into host countries.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, a man was charged in Perth for plotting to bomb Israeli buildings in Australia.
What, then, must governments do better?
Intelligence sharing is crucial. Diplomats are often soft targets. But agencies, while improving domestic arrangements, will naturally be less inclined to share information with rivals. No intelligence system will be perfect, no security measures infallible.
Whether the Vienna Convention – unchanged since 1961 – needs modernising to meet the challenges of the digital age should be discussed. This ties to broader legislative debates about enhanced coordination on cyber-monitoring of extremist threats and the role for the tech companies themselves in the policing of their platforms.
Public and institutional resilience are critical. Protecting diplomats isn’t merely about fences or bodyguards – it is about building a culture that respects the sanctity of diplomacy and rejects ideological violence in all its forms.
Extremism never sleeps. Our response, too, must be tireless.