Middle powers are reshaping the Indo-Pacific, too

The future of the Indo-Pacific is not being shaped solely in Washington and Beijing. A diverse group of middle powers is influencing the institutions, partnerships and economic networks that define the region’s evolving order.

Countries such as Japan, India, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam may not possess the global reach of the United States or China. But they have become indispensable actors whose choices influence regional outcomes.

The Indo-Pacific is not moving towards a simple bipolar order. It is becoming a more networked system in which middle powers wield growing influence in the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Few states wish to align completely with either Washington or Beijing. Instead, they seek to preserve flexibility by building diverse political, economic and security partnerships. Rather than choosing sides, many countries are choosing options.

India provides perhaps the clearest example. While deepening security cooperation with the United States and participating in the Quad, New Delhi also remains active in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and a range of initiatives (Opens in new window) associated with the Global South.

This is not neutrality. It is a deliberate strategy designed to maximise national freedom of action in an uncertain geopolitical environment.

Similar thinking can be observed across much of the Indo-Pacific. Countries are seeking to reduce vulnerabilities, diversify partnerships and ensure that strategic competition between great powers does not limit their own choices.

Japan has emerged as one of the most important architects of the contemporary Indo-Pacific. Despite demographic challenges and longstanding constitutional constraints, Tokyo has played a leading role in developing the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (Opens in new window). Support for supply-chain resilience and advocacy for the rule of law and freedom of navigation all bear Japan’s imprint. Japan demonstrates that influence does not depend solely on military power. The ability to shape norms, institutions and standards can be equally consequential. In a period of growing geopolitical uncertainty, rule-making is becoming as important as power projection.

Australia offers another example of how middle powers are adapting to changing regional realities. Canberra maintains a close alliance with the United States while remaining deeply connected to Asian markets. Managing this balance has encouraged Australia to invest heavily in flexible forms of cooperation.

Arrangements such as the Quad (Opens in new window) and AUKUS reflect a broader trend towards what is often described as minilateralism. Unlike large multilateral organisations, these smaller and more focused partnerships allow countries to cooperate on specific challenges ranging from maritime security and defence technology to critical minerals and supply chains. This approach is becoming increasingly attractive across the Indo-Pacific. It enables countries to pursue practical cooperation without requiring rigid political alignment. As a result, regional influence is exercised through networks rather than formal blocs.

Nowhere is the growing importance of middle powers more visible than in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam have all expanded their strategic significance over the past decade. Indonesia has strengthened its position as a diplomatic leader within ASEAN. Singapore remains one of the world’s most important financial and technological hubs. Vietnam has become a destination for manufacturing investment and supply-chain diversification.

Collectively, Southeast Asian states are no longer simply arenas in which larger powers compete. They are shaping the terms on which competition takes place.

The growing influence of middle powers reflects a broader transformation in the nature of power itself. ASEAN’s continuing relevance demonstrates an important truth about the contemporary Indo-Pacific. Influence is not derived exclusively from military strength. It can also be exercised through diplomacy, economic connectivity and institutional leadership. Technology, semiconductors, critical minerals, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and supply-chain resilience have become central geopolitical issues.

In many of these areas, middle powers occupy positions of extraordinary importance – evidence of a shift in which influence depends on a state’s position within economic and technological networks rather than its military capabilities alone.

South Korea remains indispensable to global semiconductor production. Japan plays a crucial role in advanced manufacturing and technology ecosystems. Singapore serves as a vital financial, logistical and technological hub connecting Asia to the wider global economy.

None of this diminishes the significance of US–China rivalry. Competition between the world’s two largest powers will remain a defining feature of international politics for years to come. But viewing the Indo-Pacific exclusively through that lens risks overlooking some of the region’s most important dynamics.

The emerging order is neither a new Cold War nor a straightforward transition from one dominant power to another. It is a more complex system in which influence is dispersed across a wider range of actors, institutions and partnerships.

Middle powers are no longer merely adapting to change. They are helping to shape it.

This evolution is attracting growing attention well beyond the region itself. European countries, including Finland, which recently adopted its first Indo-Pacific Policy Guidelines (Opens in new window), recognise that developments in the Indo-Pacific have direct implications for economic security, technological competitiveness, maritime connectivity, and the rules-based international order.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland or the Government of Finland.