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What matters is not uniformity but convergence on specific issues (Hari Nandakumar/Unsplash)

The misdiagnosis of middle power cooperation

Middle powers cannot fix the international order – but their influence should not be judged by an unrealistically high bar.

Biyon Sony Joseph

27 April 20264 min read

Scepticism about middle power cooperation is understandable. The international system is defined by sharpening rivalry, especially between the United States and China. Coordination among countries with different priorities, political systems, and regional concerns is never easy. It is tempting to dismiss the idea that middle powers acting together can shape outcomes in any meaningful way.

But the picture is more nuanced than Sanchari Ghosh suggests in The Interpreter this month. To call the idea a “myth” risks understating how influence works and how it is exercised today.

The problem lies in the benchmark being used. Much of the criticism effectively assumes that middle powers must compensate for or counterbalance great powers to be relevant. That is an unrealistic standard. Middle powers are not designed to replace great powers, and they do not need to. Their role is more modest but no less consequential. They shape outcomes in specific domains, often quietly, often incrementally, and sometimes decisively.

Influence in the current system is not only about military strength or coercive capacity. It is also about agenda-setting, rule-making, and coordination in areas where great powers are distracted, divided, or disinterested. Trade, technology standards, climate policy, and global health are all areas where outcomes are not dictated solely by the largest players, as seen in middle power-led trade agreements, coalition-driven climate initiatives, and coordinated pandemic responses. In these spaces, middle powers have room to act, and they often do.

Middle powers do not need to agree on everything to work together on something.

Critics also tend to misunderstand what “acting together” actually looks like. The expectation of a cohesive bloc of middle powers moving in lockstep is misplaced. That is not how cooperation works today. What has emerged instead is a more flexible pattern of collaboration. Countries come together on specific issues, align where interests overlap, and disengage where they do not. These arrangements are not permanent alliances. They are functional coalitions.

This kind of cooperation can appear messy, even fragile. It lacks the clarity of formal institutions or treaty-bound commitments. But it is also more adaptable. It allows countries to respond to shifting circumstances without being locked into rigid positions. In a fragmented international system, this flexibility is not a weakness but a feature.

Another common critique is that middle powers are too divided to sustain potent forms of cooperation. There is some truth to this. Differences in economic structure, security concerns, and domestic politics do complicate coordination. But diversity does not automatically preclude collaboration. Even among great powers, interests diverge sharply, yet cooperation still occurs when incentives align.

What matters is not uniformity but convergence on specific issues. Middle powers do not need to agree on everything to work together on something. In fact, limited alignment is often enough to produce tangible outcomes. The expectation of deep, enduring unity sets an unnecessarily high bar and obscures the more limited but still substantial forms of cooperation that are already taking place. Not every initiative works. Not every coalition holds. But this is true of all types of international cooperation, including those led by great powers.

There have been instances where middle powers have helped sustain trade frameworks, advance climate commitments, and coordinate responses to global challenges. These efforts rarely dominate headlines. They do not reshape the entire system. But they do shape parts of it in ways that matter.

None of this is to suggest that middle powers are without constraints. Their resources are limited. Their influence is often indirect. Domestic political pressures can narrow their room for manoeuvre. And their initiatives can be undercut by great power competition. These are real limitations, and they should not be ignored.

But acknowledging constraints is not the same as dismissing relevance, which risks collapsing a nuanced reality into a false binary. To suggest either middle powers transform the system or they do not matter is analytically neat but empirically weak.

A more accurate view recognises that influence in international politics is distributed unevenly but not exclusively. Great powers dominate certain domains, particularly those involving hard security. But they do not monopolise all forms of influence. In many areas, especially those requiring coordination rather than coercion, middle powers have both the incentive and the capacity to act.

What they offer is not a grand solution to systemic rivalry. It is something more limited but still valuable. They can keep channels open when tensions rise. They can sustain cooperation in areas where great powers are gridlocked. They can build and maintain frameworks that might otherwise erode.

This is not a “fix” for the international order. It is not meant to be. But dismissing it as a myth overlooks how the system actually functions on a day-to-day basis.

The question is not whether middle powers can resolve the structural tensions shaping global politics. They cannot. The question is whether they can shape outcomes within those constraints. On that count, the answer is not hypothetical. It is already visible.

About the author

Biyon Sony Joseph

Biyon Sony Joseph is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Thomas College, Palai (Autonomous), Kerala, India.

Topics

Diplomacy Australia United States China