Washington misreads middle power cooperation

Elbridge Colby’s recent dismissal (Opens in new window) of a collective “middle powers strategy” has reignited a live debate about the future of US alliances and partnerships. Colby, the US Under Secretary of War for Policy, delivered an unequivocal message: middle powers lack a coherent basis for alignment, remain fundamentally dependent on the United States, and would waste valuable time and political capital pursuing an alternative strategy.

Yet this framing rests on a false choice. The question is not whether middle powers are replacing the United States. Rather, it is why many of America’s closest partners are increasingly building stronger ties with one another while continuing to value US engagement.

Colby is right on several counts. No coalition of middle powers (Opens in new window) today can replicate American military capabilities or replace the United States as the principal provider of security in either Europe or the Indo-Pacific. Despite growing concerns about Washington’s unpredictability, countries such as India, Japan, Australia and Vietnam continue to regard an American strategic presence as indispensable.

Nor is there a credible substitute for much of the United States’ (Opens in new window) defence technology and industrial base, even if recent operations against Iran have exposed the challenges (Opens in new window) of sustaining military commitments across multiple theatres.

If the claim is that middle powers are attempting to construct a post-American security order, Colby is right to dismiss it.

The problem is that this is not what middle power cooperation is trying to achieve.

Colby’s central mistake is to conflate hedging with balancing. Balancing seeks to counter a dominant power. Hedging seeks to reduce vulnerability by expanding strategic options while preserving existing partnerships. Most contemporary middle power initiatives fit comfortably into the latter category.

This distinction explains an apparent paradox in contemporary geopolitics. Demand for American engagement remains strong, yet cooperation among middle powers continues to deepen. These trends are not contradictory. Strategic uncertainty encourages diversification, not divorce. Countries are strengthening ties with one another precisely because they continue to value the United States but can no longer assume that American engagement will always be predictable, unconditional or sufficient.

Ironically, Colby’s own language illustrates this logic. His assertion that access to the American defence industrial base is “a privilege, not a right” is intended to reinforce American primacy. Instead, it also provides a compelling rationale for diversification. If access to critical military technologies and capabilities is conditional rather than assured, prudent states have every reason to cultivate additional defence partnerships, invest in domestic capabilities and broaden their strategic options.

That is not an anti-American project. It is simply a realist response to strategic uncertainty.

There is also a tension in Colby’s argument. He urges allies to spend more on defence while expecting that greater capability will not translate into greater strategic agency. Yet realism has long held that material capabilities shape state behaviour. As allies become more capable, they are also likely to become more autonomous in pursuing their interests, including by expanding their strategic partnerships. Greater burden-sharing and greater strategic agency are not contradictory outcomes – they are often two sides of the same process.

Colby is equally dismissive of the basis for cooperation among middle powers, arguing that they lack a coherent foundation for alignment. But coalition-building (Opens in new window) has long been a defining characteristic of middle powers, precisely because no single one possesses the capabilities to shape regional outcomes alone. Their cooperation does not depend on a shared identity or common ideology. It rests instead on functional convergence (Opens in new window): overlapping interests in maritime security, resilient supply chains, critical minerals, emerging technologies, defence industrial cooperation and preserving an open, rules-based regional order.

Nor should this debate be viewed solely through a transatlantic lens. Although Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent remarks (Opens in new window) have revived interest in middle power cooperation, these dynamics have been unfolding in the Indo-Pacific for a few years now. The Quad, intensifying ties among India, France, Australia, Japan, Philippines and Indonesia and an expanding web of minilateral partnerships all reflect the same underlying logic: strengthening resilience through networked cooperation rather than replacing the United States. Recent signals from Washington – including greater emphasis on burden-sharing and evolving expectations of allies’ regional responsibilities – have only reinforced these incentives.

Perhaps the greatest irony is that Colby’s intervention has done more to elevate this debate than diminish it. A strategy dismissed as irrelevant rarely warrants such sustained public attention from one of Washington’s most senior defence officials.

The challenge for the United States, therefore, is not to discourage middle power cooperation but to understand what is driving it. These networks are less a vote of no confidence in American leadership than an adaptation to strategic uncertainty. A United States that encourages allies to assume greater responsibility should also expect greater strategic agency from them. Recognising that hedging is not balancing would be a better starting point than dismissing middle power cooperation as a distraction.